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West Europe Report

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6 August 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL

NETHERLANDS

- Van der Broek on European Defense, Cruise Missiles
(Hans van den Broek Interview; ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE,
30 Jun 84) 1

POLITICAL

DENMARK

- SDP Beset by Membership Drop, Jorgensen Replacement Issue
(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, various dates) 8
- Search for Identity Continuing, by Dan Axel
Mandatory Union Contributions Unresolved,
by Brian Johnck Haure
Successor for Jorgansen Sought, by Dan Axel
Vice Chairman Fight at Congress, by Dan Axel
Jorgensen on Party's Future, Anker Jorgensen Interview
Radical Left Party Seeks Defectors, by Dan Axel
SDP Suffering Largest Decline, by Steffen Jensen
Political Consultant Refutes Crisis Charges,
by Poul Erik Petersen

DENMARK/GREENLAND

- Economic, Energy Issues Among Problems Facing New Coalition
(LUXEMBURGER WORT, 28 Jun 84) 21

FINLAND

- Paper Sees New Era for Center Party Following Congress
(Editorial, Bjorn Mansson; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 19 Jun 84) 23

PORTUGAL

Briefs

Firmino Miguel Possible Candidate	27
Airplanes From PCR	27

TURKEY

Inonu Interview on Occasion of First SODEP Congress (Frdal Inonu Interview; CUMHURIYET, 26 Jun 84)	28
Birand on Backdrop to Halefoglu's FRG, Europe Tour (M. Ali Birand; MILLIYET, 26 Jun 84)	31
Social, Economic Impact of 'Guest Worker' Returnees (Nina Grunenberg; DIE ZEIT, various dates)	33
Tradition, Modernization at Odds FRG Policy Statements Confusing Opportunities, Envy Greet Returnees Younger Returnees Integration Problematic	

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Organization, Mission of Navy's Fast Attack Flotilla (Heinrich Schuur; MARINE-RUNDSCHAU, Apr 84)	52
---	----

GREECE

Reported Forthcoming Decision on 'Purchase of Century' (I KATHIMERINI, 25 Jul 84)	61
Readiness To Face Chemical Warfare Stressed (O FILELEVTHEROS, 9 Jul 84)	62

ECONOMIC

CYPRUS

Political Division Over TRNC Free Zone Proposal (CUMHURIYET, 26 Jun 84)	64
--	----

FINLAND

Forest Industry, Environmentalists Debate Need for Spraying (Kjell Westo; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 21 Jun 84)	66
--	----

Lapland Plagued With Continued High Unemployment (Thomas Olander; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 25 Jun 84)	73
PORTUGAL	
Dark Economic Outlook Ascribed to PS/PSD Government (Editorial; TEMPO, 7 Jun 84)	77
SPAIN	
EEC Steel Policy Viewed Discriminatory Against Spain (Andres Garrigo; ABC, 2 Jul 84)	81
Survey of Improved Distribution of Family Income (ABC, 2 Jul 84)	83
TURKEY	
Ilicak Sees Little Future Relief in Ozal Policy (Editorial, Nazli Ilicak; TERCUMAN, 26 Jun 84)	85
Overview of Five-Year Plan Agricultural GDP Output (DUNYA, 26 Jun 84)	87
Dogan Sees Five-Year Plan Dictated by World Bank (Yalcin Dogan; CUMHURIYET, 26 Jun 84)	90
'Dual Tax' Abolition To Facilitate FRG Capital Inflow (DUNYA, 26 Jun 84)	92
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY	
FINLAND	
Sheep Overgrazing Blamed for Erosion, Forest Damage (Lars Lundsten; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 25 Jun 84)	94
Country's First 'Problem Waste' Processing Plant Starts Tests (Carl Gustav Linden; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 20 Jun 84)	98

VAN DEN BROEK ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE, CRUISE MISSILES

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 30 Jun 84 pp 18-23

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek by Rene de Bok and Frank Lafort: "The Netherlands Is a thorn in NATO's side"; date and place not specified]

[Text] In the French Fontainebleau, the European summit had a meeting the past few days on the future of the old continent. The Dutch exertion in the NATO nuclear arms policy was a "major issue."

Below is an ELSEVIER discussion with Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek, against his will a defender of [Prime Minister] Lubbers' Moscow variant.

The leaders of the ten countries of the European Community were together this week in the castle of Fontainebleau, under the French flag, as strangers on the way to an uncertain European perspective. Toasts were made to European unity by the divided front of the European Ten. One of the plans launched in the Fontainebleau castle in the air was more say for Europe in the security policy dominated by the United States.

On the eve of the European summit meeting Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek was asked: /How can Europe increase its influence over its own defense?/

Van den Broek: "When there are complaints in Europe about the somewhat dominant position of the United States in NATO, it is more a matter of division in Europe itself on questions of security than of the Americans' desire to dominate. I do make a distinction, however: during the past months more and more voices have been heard in favor of strengthening the European voice in the alliance through a revival of the West European Union and through all sorts of plans of European ministers . . ."

[Question] The INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] debate in Geneva on the medium range missiles in Europe is vital to the European security. Now that debate has come to a dead end due to the departure of the Soviet Union. Might one expect an initiative by the European Ten during the coming months to get a discussion between the superpowers started again?

[Van den Broek] "Much has to be done before one can speak of a common foreign policy of the European Ten. However, political pronouncements by the Ten carry more weight than statements by the individual countries. If one can reach agreement by give-and-take, one should do so, for such a European voice is of great importance, not only with respect to incidental statements or communiques on the Middle East or Latin America, but also with respect to the position to take at a European disarmament conference in Stockholm, at follow-up conferences of Helsinki, and also at the forum of the United Nations where last year I had the feeling that we were drifting farther apart rather than getting closer together.

[Question] But the EDC (European Disarmament Conference) in Stockholm was not established to create a European security system.

[Van den Broek] No. Let's remove that misunderstanding instantly. When I speak of a stronger European input in the alliance context, that already indicates that I certainly do not mean the striving for a separate European defense. I consider that absolutely impossible. The United States is indispensable for our Western security, and Washington's nuclear guarantee is an inseparable component of it. I want to make that clear from the start. And, apart from the question whether such a European defense with its own nuclear force would be feasible financially, the entire idea contradicts the attempts to decrease the role of nuclear arms.

"Moreover, a separate European defense is also undesirable from an international-political viewpoint. I hate to think of the destabilizing role which a European nuclear force would bring along, also against the background of the German question. What would the position of the Federal Republic of Germany be, and how would French-German relations develop?

"There would also be discussions on the question: Who has his finger on the nuclear trigger in Europe? We would become dependent on the French and British nuclear forces. I think that Europe's stability would be rather dismal. . ."

[Question] Thus an excessive preoccupation with Europe is also wrong?

[Van den Broek] "In this respect an obsession with Europe could be fatal. But that does not mean that Europe should not speak up. That is already being done in statements on problem areas in the world: Europe gives its view on the southern Africa-Namibia problem, the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Central America. It would be good if Europe also played a role in matters which concern the collective security interest. Europe could perform a bridge role with that in East-West relations."

[Question] But where exactly is there a task for the Netherlands to play a role, via a disarmament strategy, in the process of detente between East and West? That is the claim of the most recent nuclear arms decision of the Lubbers Cabinet, isn't it?

[Van den Broek] "The basis of the most recent decision is the concern over the arms race and, coupled to that, the firm intent to furnish a contribution to arms control with limited means. That was the basis of the condition in 1979 and it still is the basis today. While arms discussions have been stopped, the building of arms systems continues unabated. We do not want to acquiesce in that situation.

[Question] Those signals will only be heard elsewhere if they are amplified through European or Atlantic instruments.

[Van den Broek] "In principle you are correct: arms control belongs in the debate between the superpowers, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO if you prefer. The Warsaw Pact countries have nuclear systems of the Soviet Union in their territory; the NATO countries accommodate American systems. But that debate is stagnating. The Dutch decision is a signal that the debate must be resumed. And we have added the hope for a certain turnaround on the Soviet side, which is a basic condition for resuming the discussion. Surely you will agree with me: if after a year it turns out that, for the sake of the Netherlands--I say it with a smile--for the sake of their own interest, the Soviet Union has truly frozen the building of SS-20 arsenals, do you think that our NATO allies would reproach us then for rejecting the placing at that time? Don't you think that the importance of this turnaround, the stopping of this train in order to make it go backward subsequently, is an importance which greatly exceeds that of stationing 48 missiles in the Netherlands?

[Question] You have in any event Mient-Jan Faber [Interchurch Peace Council] on your side.

Hans van den Broek ignores the teasing remark: Especially since the Netherlands has added to its decision that it is prepared to make its contribution if an arms agreement is achieved between the superpowers."

[Question] As a NATO loyalist you must have decided that the Netherlands has changed from a loyal ally into a stubborn nuisance.

[Van den Broek] "With the position which the Netherlands has opted for since 1979, we are--let's admit it frankly--a thorn in the side of the alliance. I still believe that we should not be too fearful of that role as long as we can convince our allies of our fundamental solidarity. We should not be too easily restrained by the idea: gosh, the unity of the alliance will be endangered. NATO's strength lies precisely in the fact that the organization is composed of democracies which can express their opinions openly and freely in the alliance."

[Question] The Netherlands has made the unilateral decision not to place nuclear arms if the Soviets freeze their SS-20 arsenal. In doing so, the Netherlands is placing itself outside of the NATO discipline.

[Van den Broek] We have maintained a separate position since 1979 with respect to the dual decision. Now the time has arrived to go at it hammer and

tongs, to put it informally. It is just that we are not yet carrying out the dual decision of 1979, but we did not do it at that time either.

[Question] In the FRG, when referring to the Dutch decision, people are saying things like: they have the advantages and we carry the burden.

[Van den Broek] "I won't let that happen. That would only be the case if we were not prepared to participate proportionally in establishing an arms control agreement. But that is not the case. It is now absolutely clear what the Netherlands is prepared to do. I find that a great progress over the past 4 years. It will make our position in the alliance easier and more credible in the coming period."

In the discussion with Hans van den Broek a sharp exchange of ideas develops on the question of whether the American President Reagan gave Van den Broek the green light to submit the Moscow variant to the Dutch parliament. We presume that the Dutch decision is under the auspices of the United States. After considerable pussy-footing Van den Broek makes that suggestion acceptable. He rejects the assumption that he was given the green light by Reagan via the method of quiet diplomacy. Van den Broek (in a formal tone of voice): "From the reactions to the decision you were able to learn of the disappointment of the American Government with the fact that we did not categorically join the NATO dual decision. I have complete understanding for that. But I insist that we can continue to play our role in NATO in an adequate manner, and I have indications to that effect. . ."

[Question] That more or less confirms the assumption of our question. . .

[Van den Broek] "I don't make statements on bilateral consultations. But you must take my word that this minister of foreign affairs would never have agreed to a Dutch cabinet decision which would fundamentally undermine our position in the alliance. That has always been my position and I have also observed during the cabinet consultation over many weeks that not even one member of the cabinet wanted that. The most important consideration was that the alliance was vital to us, both with respect to the collective defense and the debate on arms control. Alienating ourselves from this alliance would not serve those purposes in any manner whatsoever."

[Question] You are of course not the type of minister of foreign affairs who would present the most important ally with a fait accompli. . .

[Van den Broek] "Now you want to know again what I discussed with President Reagan in advance . . . I find it very important to consult closely with the allies, also when it is a matter of explaining the national-political situation in the Netherlands, which also has its own requirements. The alliance is only served by a cabinet decision of which it knows that it has a real possibility in parliament. It ought to be a rule of thumb that, as a member of the alliance, you should have close consultations with your partners. If you feel pressed to go in a different direction, for whatever reason, solidarity demands that you consult about that as much and as closely as possible."

[Van den Broek] Since that time it was agreed in the NATO context that we want to promote the constructive dialogue between East and West as much as possible. In that framework we decided to build up the ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union again. Extensive plans were made for that. Minister of Agriculture Braks would have gone to Moscow even earlier if that incident with the Korean airplane had not occurred. He went later on instead. And the trip of Mrs Smit [Minister of Transport and Public Works] must also be seen within the framework of initiating the dialogue again. Not because we think that the attitude of the Soviet Union has changed overnight, but because we believe that at this moment we cannot afford to shun the dialogue in this tense situation.

"I will explain the nuclear arms decision to my Soviet colleague. But it cannot be explained as a bilateral negotiation between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union, for one cannot negotiate on this decision. It announces something to the Soviet Union; it makes an urgent appeal and explains the consequences for the Dutch situation."

[Question] Not long before the Soviet departure from Geneva Van den Broek stated that he did not take seriously the Soviets' threat to leave. If they should indeed do so, Van den Broek thought, they would return to the negotiation table rather quickly . . .

[Van den Broek] "Then I will have to make a subtle distinction. Threatening to leave can never be a reason to adjust your own position. If that were the case, each party could play off that threat in negotiations in order to confuse its opponent. If you were to ask me: What are the expectations that the Soviets will change their mind, then I think that such a resumption cannot be expected in the short term. The Soviets probably will act reticently in collaborating in any manner in the reelection of Reagan as President of the United States. I still hope, however, that those INF negotiations will be resumed next year."

[Question] At this moment the dialogue is primarily characterized by cold-war rhetoric. Van den Broek pointed that out to his Soviet colleague Gromyko in Stockholm after the Soviet minister once again made an attack on America in his well-known manner.

[Van den Broek] "The superpowers both vented their spleen at each other with strong language. But the only possibility of effecting a certain thaw is to continue the dialogue together. Then you will observe that changes continually take place in East and West positions, but only if there is discussion and if there are attempts to find a way in which to continue the discussion. I don't believe that our generation will witness the bridging of the ideological contrasts between East and West. They are much too deep for that, and the difference is much too fundamental for that between the marxist-leninist doctrine, the dictatorship on the one hand and the democracy on the other hand. That does not remove the fact that we do have the obligation to take care that these different ideologies, doctrines and state systems can continue to exist side by side."

Hans van den Broek's personal position comes up for discussion. The minister of foreign affairs experienced a metamorphosis from NATO loyalist with a strong dose of distrust toward the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to a minister who supports Lubbers' rescue operation without complaining. The Van den Broek of the Moscow variant appears to be different from the minister who emphasizes solidarity within NATO.

The latest Andropov proposal last January provided for a reduction of 250 SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe to 140, a freeze of the SS-20 arsenal and dismantling of the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. At that time Van den Broek found the Andropov proposal unacceptable because it legitimized the dominance of SS-20 missiles. Today the Lubbers Cabinet, including Van den Broek, accept the monopoly of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union freezes the existing SS-20 dominance before November '85, the Netherlands will refrain from placing 48 cruise missiles.

Van den Broek sees this "again as a misunderstanding. We absolutely do not accept a ratio of one to two in Europe. The Dutch decision is aimed at effecting a reversal which necessitates further negotiations on arms reductions. In no way whatsoever must one see this decision as the acceptance of one to two. But . . . if the Soviet Union does not halt the buildup, then upon completion of the NATO program of 572 missiles we no longer are concerned with a ratio of one to two, but with one to three.

"However, at this point we are still facing the pressing question of how the current disproportion can be reversed."

[Question] There is no guarantee whatsoever that the Soviet Union will pay any attention to the Dutch initiative. And the unstable situation continues to exist unabatedly.

[Van den Broek] "I know what you mean: what is better can be the enemy of what is good. We have used the condition of 1979 for the last time as an instrument to effect an arms reduction. Whether that succeeds will be found out in November '85. If it does not succeed, the condition has been completely ineffective and then the Netherlands will place. There can be no misunderstanding on that."

[Question] In the meantime the Netherlands is creating the impression that, attempts are being made, via a bilateral offensive, to win the Soviet Union over to its vision on world peace. Dutch politicians are traveling back and forth, in sharp contrast to the cool policy which the Netherlands announced after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even in January Van den Broek still said that it was one of the objectives of the Soviet Union to separate the allies.

[Van den Broek] "We froze contacts at the ministerial level after Afghanistan. Since that time new developments have taken place"

[Question] Poland, the Korean jetliner . . .

[Question] With that, Van den Broek endorses a vital premise of the foreign policy: to co-exist peacefully between the systems of East and West. But that condition does not seem to be realized in the Netherlands yet; through the categorical rejection of the NATO dual decision, a foreign political policy in the Netherlands which has broad consensus seems to be more an illusion than reality.

[Van den Broek] "I lament that position of the PvdA [Labor Party] and obviously Mient Jan Faber does that too. I think that in the area of nuclear arms problems it would be very good to get an as broad as possible basis of support in parliament. It is an important political fact that we have now succeeded in getting more than just marginal support in the Chamber. In all the months prior to the decision, I myself doubted that strongly on many occasions. I should confess to you now that I barely considered it possible that such a decision could be made without asking for a vote of confidence, without grasping the last straw. That has certainly had a depolarizing effect. If the vote of confidence had been asked for, then the frustrations would again have run very high here, just as in 1979. That would have seriously handicapped the work during the coming 1½ years."

[Question] For the time being, a repeat performance of the spectacle seems likely in the autumn of '85.

[Van den Broek] "We will not escape an extensive exchange of ideas in the Chamber. But it will not be an open debate; if the Soviets continue with the stationing of their SS-20's, I cannot see--and I repeat that once more--which circumstances would then still stand in the way of a positive placing decision."

[Question] Will the Chamber still deviate from a cabinet decision then; will there still be a crisis hanging over us?

[Van den Broek] "Unambiguous agreements have been made in the cabinet. They form the basis on which I have to operate in the alliance. You may take my word that I attach considerable importance to keeping the Dutch role within NATO at a credible level. That says enough, I think."

"The use of the word crisis seems completely premature to me."

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SDP BESET BY MEMBERSHIP DROP, JORGENSEN REPLACEMENT ISSUE

Search for Identity Continuing

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Jul 84 p 1

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] On top of the discussion of a more pronounced opposition profile and plans for big personnel shifts, the Social Democrats must now also take a stand on a sharp criticism of the party apparatus.

Social Democratic voter associations are reporting massive declines in membership figures. And it is now expected that for the first time in recent history the Social Democrats will go below the magic level of 100,000 members at its congress. That would represent a membership loss of between 5,000 and 10,000 in just 1 year.

Thus the Social Democratic crisis is not just to find a new political profile in opposition activities at Christiansborg but to get the entire basic party apparatus to function as well.

A member of the executive committee of the party told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE: "We are sick and tired of the party office in Nyropsgade spending more time on armchair politics--and on finding political platforms for individual politicians--than on helping and informing the average member."

The criticism from local groups is not new but it has been given new relevance by the entire debate on which people should be in charge of the widespread modernization of the party apparatus that everyone agrees is necessary.

Dissatisfaction in the local voter associations is reflected by the fact that a proposal has been submitted to the congress in September that a larger proportion of the dues remain in local hands--and not be sent in for use on central activities.

The proposal would undermine the present party office and therefore puts pressure on Social Democratic leaders who will be forced to make firm

commitments concerning a more efficient party apparatus that is on a better wave length with membership organizations.

Mandatory Union Contributions Unresolved

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Brian Johnck Haure]

[Text] The attempt by LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] to find an arrangement that would exempt members from contributing to the Social Democratic Party has been totally rejected by the independent trade unions. "It is the entire association between LO and the Social Democrats that is fatally wrong," they say.

"LO's proposal for finding an easy solution that would free members from contributing to the Social Democratic Party does not alter the fact that LO still functions as part of the party. This does not involve just a few orer a day, as Knud Christensen tried to suggest. This involves the whole principle of the thing. Besides the proposal has already been watered down with Knud Christensen's statement that it will be sent out for local approval," said business manager Ernst Nielsen of Danish Free Trade Unions in response to LO's proposal to exempt members who do not want to support the Social Democratic Party.

LO chairman Knud Christensen said the proposal will be taken up by LO's executive committee at its meeting on 3 August. By then there will be a concrete proposal for solving the problem. But it appears already that it will be left up to individual member organizations to decide how to tackle the problem. Svend Auken (Social Democrat), who is the party's representative on the LO executive committee, is one of those behind the new position. His idea is that contributions from the members who do not want to support the Social Democrats can go to so-called "idealistic causes," such as the Red Cross, the Arthritis Foundation, etc.

The Christian Trade Union group is right in line in its total rejection of the proposed solution:

"I am disturbed that supposedly responsible people can seriously present and discuss a proposal of this kind and I am dumbfounded that LO continues to demonstrate its total inability to come up with new ideas. But it helps us out by chasing a lot of new members over to us. This whole proposal is intended to conceal an effort to prevent an anticipated mass exodus of members. It is the whole association between LO and the Social Democratic Party that is fatally wrong. Who do these people think they are when they officiously assume the right to juggle around the money paid by members?" asked Per Boysen of the Christian Trade Unions group.

The Christian Trade Unions group currently has a net increase of 6-700 new members a month and by its own account is on the way toward having 30,000 members.

Successor for Jorgensen Sought

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] The former prime minister will celebrate his 62nd birthday tomorrow while the initial search is on at both high and low levels of the Social Democratic Party to find a successor for him when he decides to step down.

Party chairman Anker Jorgensen made an enormous blunder last week when he hastily summoned the Social Democratic executive committee to give its approval to the party's candidates for vice chairman and party secretary.

That is the opinion of the Social Democratic chairman for Copenhagen County, Eva Clausen, who said that "no clarification took place--on the contrary we just showed the world that we disagree. And that gave fresh fuel to the personality debate."

Eva Clausen admitted that it was a mistake that the Social Democratic equal rights committee "simply rushed to publicize the candidates women want nominated. But it is meaningless to blame us women afterwards for using methods that others have used too," the county chairman told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The result has been that the personality clash--what is known as the war of succession in the Social Democratic Party--has now flared up with renewed force. And this at a time when party chairman Anker Jorgensen will be celebrating his 62nd birthday tomorrow in his summer house in Hundested, while one "crown prince"--Svend Auken--is on a camping and canoing trip in Sweden, another--Knud Heinesen--is sightseeing in Belgium and the women's candidate--Helle Degn--is enjoying the sunshine in the Greek Archipelago.

"When the cats are away the mice will play."

Internal Unrest

Against the background of Saturday's meeting--considered superfluous by some--the internal unrest among party officials has mounted. Among other things several county chairmen are already saying that they will not follow the recommendations of the leadership blindly.

And somewhat unusually the newspaper AKTUELT itself has dealt with the personality issue in several big articles. Speculations and rumors were aired there in the same way as they are in the rest of the daily press. So something is in the wind!

Very few Social Democrats want their names used in the debate at the present time--at least if they have outstanding views--but almost all those who spoke--incognito--to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE agreed that "Anker's successor as chairman will be Auken--when Anker himself decides to step down."

A prerequisite for a peaceful chairmanship transition is that Knud Heinesen--despite the fact that he was unanimously nominated as sole vice chairman on Saturday--definitely leaves the top Social Democratic leadership--perhaps for a top position with Danish Radio, the post of mayor of Copenhagen or an ambassadorship. These are the rumors that have been circulating for some time without provoking many firm denials.

After that Svend Auken would be placed in the "successor's post" in the daily party leadership--in order to be able to step in the minute Anker Jorgensen decides the party needs a new chairman.

Party Secretary

No fewer than 10 names have been mentioned in connection with the post of Social Democratic party secretary--a position that has been strongly criticized in the past, especially by voter associations, because the work has been spread out over too many areas.

At its extraordinary meeting the executive committee managed to reach a majority agreement to recommend the present international secretary, Steen Christensen, 30. But he is expected to get a lot of stiff competition when the lobbying breaks out in the final hours before the party congress.

The reason why the party and the union movement have not presented a well-known face for this vital post--to succeed the new member of the EC Parliament, Ejner Hovgaard Christiansen--is, according to several well-informed sources, that it is not yet certain whether a party secretary will be elected at all.

The executive committee decided by 14 votes to 13 that there would be a four-person leadership of the party. The 13 dissenters wanted a three-person leadership with a chairman, two vice chairmen and no party secretary. This proposal will be brought before the congress and already has the support of several county districts.

Some of the names mentioned as party secretary candidates--depending on the shape the post is given--are: Poul Nielson (former energy minister), John Svenningsen (LO), Bent Greve (leader of the secretariat of the Journalists' Union), Inge Nesgaard (Aalborg deputy mayor) and several local county chairmen and some employees at the party office on Nyropsgade.

Vice Chairman Fight at Congress

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] Despite urgent requests it is very seldom that the union movement can get its own people to go to work for the party. Therefore it can only pick one candidate over another when the Social Democratic Party makes its nominations. But even if the top people now agree on who should make up the party leadership, the congress in September could produce chaos if it votes in favor of a proposal for a troika leadership--instead of the present gang of four.

The union movement and the Social Democrats are careful to keep in step when it comes to last-minute intrigues when obstreperous party colleagues who want to upset the balance of power in the top leadership must be put in their place. But LO almost always breaks step when it wants to fulfill its most ardent desire--namely to place a well-known union chairman or chairwoman in the party's top leadership. Simply because there is no one who is interested.

That was also the situation last week when Social Democratic chairman Anker Jorgensen--again at a very late date--entered the party maneuvering over which woman should be placed in the vice chairmanship. Social Democratic women had been preparing for this for some time.

The union movement tried in vain to come up with its own woman candidate for the post. None of them wanted to take on the job, so "then it was a question of choosing between two evils," as a representative of one of the biggest labor unions put it when talking to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. This suggests that the two women are both felt to be somewhat further to the left of center than the union movement normally likes.

As we know the evils were Helle Degn--nominated by the equal rights committee of the Social Democratic Party and the two women county chairman on the party's executive committee--and Radio Council chairman Birte Weiss who was "pulled out of a hat at the last minute" by party chairman Anker Jorgensen and vice chairman Knud Heinesen.

Birte Weiss is the one the union movement voted for--primarily because Helle Degn was promoted by Ritt Bjerregaard and she is "not our cup of tea," as LO chairman Knud Christensen once said.

Old Grudge

The antagonism between the union movement and Ritt Bjerregaard is not a new phenomenon. It goes all the way back to her term as minister when--in the opinion of the union movement--she did not exactly cast a friendly eye on the proposals and demands from Rosenorns Alle.

Others within the labor movement put it like this: "The union movement does not know where she stands. She does not reveal how she stands on concrete ideas and proposals. And that is not popular."

But Ritt Bjerregaard told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that there was no question of political ideological differences of opinion between her and the union movement.

"All we want is to get more women in the top leadership of the party. So I regard this as a women's policy issue that may of course have some political consequences--but women's policy is what is at stake," Ritt Bjerregaard said.

The efforts to find a candidate that the party's women could support is closely connected with the fact that these same women "would then be in a stronger position when it comes to contested balloting on the other important post in the party, namely the post of party secretary," she said.

The women then selected Alborg deputy mayor Inge Nesgaard--but like Helle Degn she received only four out of a total of 13 votes at the party's expanded executive committee meeting while Steen Christensen, international secretary at the SDP office received seven. The other two votes went to Tage Sorensen from Aarhus.

Chaos Looming

The very fact that it now looks as if the whole roster of people will work out--at least in the view of the present party leadership--makes the Social Democratic congress even more vulnerable to sudden changes.

The entire plan will collapse like a house of cards--and chaos will result--if the congress does not follow the executive committee's recommendation that the top party leadership continue to consist of four people--one chairman, two vice chairmen and a party secretary. Strong forces on the executive committee--including the committee that prepared an alteration to the party's ruling structure--have already recommended that the leadership consist of only three people--chairman, vice chairman and secretary. And that proposal will also be voted on at the congress which begins on 15 September.

The totally bizarre situation could arise that former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen could find himself in a contest with Birte Weiss whom he himself encouraged to run for one of the vice chairmanships.

And if the party is to retain a female element in the top leadership (which is unavoidable!) there would be a real prospect of a choice between Birte Weiss, Knud Heinesen and possibly also Helle Degn.

At the same time sources on the Social Democratic executive committee told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that there actually had been mention of the fact that

only the four-person model would assure Knud Heinesen of a place in the party leadership.

The alternative--in a troika solution--would be having a woman in the very important post of party secretary--and so far the regular Social Democratic leadership has not wanted that to happen.

Jorgensen on Party's Future

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jul 84 p 7

[Interview with SDP chairman Anker Jorgensen by Dan Axel]

[Text] "The goal of the Social Democratic Party is still to return to government power but not just to carry out a nonsocialist majority's policies," said former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, celebrating his 62nd birthday, in a conversation about what the current power struggle in the party can be used for, how the opposition party will place itself in relation to SF [Socialist People's Party] and how the party apparatus can be modernized and made more effective.

At the party congress Social Democratic Party chairman Anker Jorgensen will present an outline of how to modernize the work done by the much-criticized party apparatus and make it more efficient. This is the leadership's response to strong criticism from local voters' associations.

"We are prepared to arrange the entire working procedure in the administration and the leadership of the party in a better way--if possible. And we are actually already considering how this can be done," said Anker Jorgensen, adding that "we cannot afford to hire a whole lot more people, however."

Anker Jorgensen admitted that there has been criticism that the party office did not function satisfactorily in all areas. "But I do not think the arguments presented have been so good that one can say it is all justified. But, of course everything can be improved on," said Anker Jorgensen.

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party pointed out that "I have the major responsibility if something as a whole is not working satisfactorily. I think the present party secretary, who has worked hard at the job for 13 years, has done so extremely well."

And Anker Jorgensen thought the congress in September will maintain the tradition that it is the body that elects a party secretary. Thus a four-person leadership of the Social Democrats could continue, he said.

Power Struggle

[Jorgensen] I know that in other parties the party secretary is appointed. And if the congress wants something like that we will respect its wishes.

[Question] What does it mean for the party's "image" that leading Social Democrats are apparently waging an open struggle for power?

[Answer] There is no question of disruption or revolt in the party, this is a normal democratic process that one must respect. Actually it is natural that there be a discussion prior to a congress on who should be vice chairman and party secretary--when these posts are vacant.

And on this point some of us have one opinion and others have another. And before we get to the congress it is very conceivable that there will be even more candidates than those we have already heard about.

(In contrast to the women's wing in the Social Democratic Party, Anker Jorgensen feels the extraordinary executive committee meeting last week--end really created the clarification of personalities that the party leadership was hoping for.)

The executive committee recommended two people--namely Birte Weiss and Steen Christensen--and that is why I think a clarification has occurred. But no one can expect a final decision before the congress itself. (Here Anker Jorgensen referred to the party rules that people can be nominated until 12 o'clock noon of the day before voting is to take place.)

Profile Debate

[Question] The Social Democrats are being attacked--both from outside and from within--for having a too blurred opposition political profile.

[Answer] Yes, that is true. But it is worth noting that some people think we are too weak while others think we come on too strong. (Jorgensen then mentioned his party's security policy course.)

Some people--not many--think we have presented too strong a profile in this context. I don't think so. I am convinced that we have done the right thing and that a very broad majority--even the government--will accept this security policy. Actually things have already gone a long way in this direction.

In my view the line in the Social Democratic profile debate should mean that we will be a cooperative party but at the same time we need to be seen. (The SDP chairman places his party's credibility above easy solutions.)

(Jorgensen had this to say about the past week's many rumors, personal stories and summer balloons--often sent to market by anonymous Social

Democratic members:) There is no reason to seriously criticize that. Our policy is apparent to everyone--and clearly written down in our very relevant program, "The Course of Solidarity," which after all was prepared during the opposition period.

Concern About SF

[Question] Several people have said that the Social Democrats are concerned about losing seats and active members to SF.

[Answer] SF people are busy telling us how excellent our program is. And they would love to help us implement it.

And when we cannot implement it right away, they take shots at us.

But the explanation is that we really have to have a nonsocialist party--at the moment the Radical Liberals--along with us in order to have a majority.

So there are some who become impatient and think the Social Democrats do not intend to do what stands in the program but we cannot act with more strength than parliamentary opportunities allow.

(In this context Jorgensen used the old image of the jacket whose right and left sleeves are both being pulled in different directions.)

The conclusion must be--for SF as well--that the Social Democrats are the progressive alternative in Danish politics.

And we will be glad to listen to what SF has to say--and the same thing applies to the Radical Liberals--for otherwise we are just making elegant speeches instead of talking about real issues.

The goal continues to be restoring government power to the Social Democrats.

But we do not want power simply to sit there--and have to implement the policies of a nonsocialist majority, which has been the clear tendency in the past.

Radical Left Party Seeks Defectors

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] "The personal conflicts and the political confusion in the Social Democratic Party give us good opportunities to conduct forays among the party's officials," said SF vice chairman Aage Frandsen.

"We see before us a party in disarray--practically on the verge of splitting up. And although it is not nice to kick someone who is unsteady on his feet, we are doing so anyway. The Social Democrats must be forced to accept the fact that the only alternative to the nonsocialist government is a labor majority."

These words were spoken by chief SF ideologist, vice chairman Aage Frandsen, who from his vacation outpost on Livo in Limfjorden agreed with several anonymous Social Democratic officials that "it looks as if the new profile in the Social Democratic Party is intended more to clip the wings of SF than to present a serious challenge to the four-party government."

"The Social Democrats are struggling with some of the problems we had ourselves in the beginning of the 1970's," said Aage Frandsen to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. "Namely a hierarchical system run from the top that is too old-fashioned, too slow and incapable of understanding and taking hold of the trends that exist among the people."

The SF ideologist noted dryly that the massive internal conflicts in the Social Democratic Party--along with a very weak opposition policy--provided good opportunities for SF to make raids on active Social Democrats "to look at it from a somewhat partisan point of view. And even though we would like to see Schluter a long way from the government we must realize that the longer the Social Democrats are in the opposition, the more likely it is that the party will carry out the good intentions written in its own program," said Aage Frandsen.

In spite of everything SF will continue to invite the Social Democrats to cooperate closely at the top level. "But otherwise we must put pressure on the Social Democratic groups that are closest to us--for example the people in SiD [Semiskilled Workers' Union], the equal rights committee and parts of the Folketing group," Aage Frandsen concluded.

SDP Suffering Largest Decline

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by Steffen Jensen]

[Text] Most of the old political parties have experienced a dramatic decline in membership in the last 20 years.

But it has been worst for the Social Democrats who have lost over 130,000 members since the middle of the 1960's.

At the same time SF has slowly but surely made inroads into the left wing of the Social Democratic Party.

The "Political Weekly Newsletter" from Management Press shows that while in the mid-1960's there were 585,000 active members of political party organizations the figure has now dropped to 255,000 in 1984--a decline of around 300,000 people or more than 50 percent.

The four old parties, the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Conservatives and the Liberals, have lost around 50 percent of their members since 1966. Although the membership flight has hit the old parties the hardest the Conservatives have made some gains in recent years.

Decline of 45 Percent

Since 1966 when the Social Democrats had almost a quarter of a million members they have plunged to 107,000 in 1983/84--a 45 percent decline.

According to well-informed sources the party has recently lost another 10,000 or so members.

The Radical Liberals have lost two-thirds of their members since 1966. The Conservatives had lost more than two-thirds up to 1980 but have since added 8,000 new members. The Liberals have been cut almost in half since 1966.

SF is the only party for many years to make steady gains recently. Although it has not yet amounted to much the party has now set its highest record to date with over 7,000 members. Since there are around 3.8 million eligible voters this means that less than 8 percent of all voters belong to a party that is able to run candidates for public office.

Membership Figures of Political Parties

Party	Membership Figures				
	1953	1966	1977	1980	1983/84
Social Democrats	283,000	240,000	125,000	106,000	107,000
Radical Liberals	35,000	30,000	20,000	13,400	10,000
Conservatives	89,000	141,800	48,200	44,000	52,000
Single-Tax Party	11,000	--	3,000	3,000	--
Socialist People's Party		6,000	4,600	5,000	7,100
Communists	20,000	--	11,000	--	--
Center-Democrats			2,000	1,700	2,100
Christian People's Party			11,600	10,400	10,800
Liberals	187,000	168,000	105,500	100,000	89,500
Left-Socialists			3,000	3,000	1,800
Progressives			15,000	10,000	9,000
Total	626,000	585,800	348,900	296,500	289,300

Political Consultant Refutes Crisis Charges

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by Poul Erik Petersen]

[Text] Advertising man Morten Jersild thinks the open debate on structure and ideology in the Social Democratic Party is a sign of health that will benefit the party in the long run. And he does not believe for a minute that Anker Jorgensen lost his grip on developments at any time.

From the outside it looks as if a tremendous disorganized dogfight is taking place in the Social Democratic Party today. One might think such a conflict would damage the party. But advertising man Morten Jersild, who was once a consultant to the party, does not think that the debate that is going on has been so poorly managed.

"If I had been asked as a communications man to give the Social Democrats my advice, I would definitely have advised them to have an open debate but I would have pointed out that it could damage the party in the short term although it would be beneficial in the longer run.

"And I would have tried to make it seem less like a dispute over personalities and more like a debate on goals and means," said Morten Jersild who does not believe it will do much harm to the SDP even though the party appears to be washing its dirty linen in public just now. Morten Jersild does not think for a minute that the debate and developments have slipped out of Anker Jorgensen's hands.

Media and Personal Conflicts

"I do not think the debate indicates a deliberate marketing of the party. But I do believe, on the other hand, that all the people involved have been quite aware of how things and viewpoints have been presented. And Anker Jorgensen is wise enough and experienced enough as a leader that he could have kept the debate an internal party matter if he had wanted to. And what is happening is that they will undoubtedly end up in agreement. That will strengthen the party."

Although the conflict appears to deal with personalities such as Birte Weiss, Helle Degn, Ritt Bjerregaard, Knud Heinesen, Svend Auken and the placement of others in the Social Democratic Party apparatus, Morten Jersild does not believe that any of those involved will emerge much the worse for it.

"I would like to emphasize that I do not think anyone blundered in this matter," he said. "But the press in particular is personifying a debate that deep down concerns ideologies, not personalities.

"It should be regarded as a healthy sign that a party takes a good look at itself after many years in government and realistically admits that there is a difference between being a government party and being an opposition party. In the opposition one has the time and the opportunity to go back to one's roots and ask: 'What are we and how are we regarded?' As a government party one must enter into so many compromises that eventually one looks like a gray party with no profile."

Parties and Businesses

Morten Jersild has no doubt that the debate that is being conducted at the moment will definitely benefit the party and increase confidence in it. In particular this may attract young voters who by following the discussion could come to regard the SDP as a vital party and not just one with established people and ideas.

"It is a little strange to see how the press treats and evaluates this matter if we try to make a comparison with businesses in the private sector. The press makes constant demands for openness when it comes to the decision-making processes of private businesses. And the press is somewhat offended if its representatives are denied access to boards of directors, management and employees.

"I think we should welcome the fact that there is the same openness in the country's biggest party as we practically demand from businesses. I cannot see why one should apply different standards when it concerns a political party than we would apply to a private business," said Morten Jersild.

He also feels the Radical Liberals should adopt the same strategy as the Social Democrats.

"If I were to give some good advice to the Radicals, I would say that an open ideological debate would strengthen the party. The exact opposite is going on in their party with the result that the party is regarded as a house divided against itself."

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CSO: 3613/188

ECONOMIC, ENERGY ISSUES AMONG PROBLEMS FACING NEW COALITION

Luxembourg LUXEMBURGER WORT in German 28 Jun 84 p 10

[Text] Godthap (dpa)—"The white man has been standing on our toes for so long that some of them are prone to be angry when we pull our foot away." Thus the sole and last Greenland delegate to the European Community, Finn Lyange, quoted one of his Eskimo ancestors. Now Greenland has pulled its foot out of the door of the European Community and is leaving the EEC on 1 January 1985. The primary cause of the abrupt turning away of the approximately 40,000 Greenlanders and Eskimos was the desire to have undivided control of their own resources on land and, above all, in the sea. The movement of independence from Europe indirectly accelerated the limited autonomy granted to the country in 1979 and has led to the third parliamentary election only 5 years afterwards.

The fishing agreement with the EEC, which allowed the EEC countries--mainly the German Federal Republic--to catch 140,000 metric tons of fish from Greenland's waters annually and granted Greenland 217 million kroner (1.2 billion francs) over the next 5 years, had led to the early reelections. It was above all the Marxist-nationalist Inuit [People's] Party that had felt duped and believed that the Social-Democrat oriented Siumut Government should have gained more money for less fish at the negotiations in Brussels. The government lost its parliamentary support in a no-confidence vote. But the new elections of last Wednesday did not change the power alignment in parliament. The Siumut and the middle-class Attasut Parties returned to the Landsting (parliament) in equal strength, each having 12 delegates. The Inuit Party will be represented in parliament with three delegates, a gain of one.

The economic future of the Arctic country lies under the ice--in places, 3,000 meters thick--and off the 34,000-kilometer-long coast. Apart from the Danish consultation right, however, differing opinions prevail concerning the splitting and sharing of the natural resources, a situation calling for the unifying force of a stabile government. The principal role is being played by the fishing industry, on which about a quarter of the total population depends.

In the presence of foreign journalists in Godthap, the capital city, the concerned political and economic circles presented a confusing body of figures that can be summarized as follows: the Greenlanders are allowed an annual catch of 110,000 metric tons of fish in their own waters; overfishing and change of climate threaten both supplies and prices of fish.

Fishing has the same importance for Greenland as agriculture does for the EEC. Against this background, one can understand the efforts of politicians to retain for their citizens as much as possible the main source of livelihood: fishing. In the election campaign, there was discussion about renegotiating the fishing agreement. In the view of the Siumut politician Moses Olsen, the member of government in charge of the economy, though, this is not a realistic alternative for a better treaty.

In the Arctic, however, Nature prevails over all planning efforts. The approximately 500 ships in the Greenland fleet were unable to take their quotas of fish due to the past two record-breaking cold winters. If the water temperature falls by only 0.5 degrees, the development of cod, the fish most caught, is disturbed, or the fully-grown fish flee to warmer areas.

To the extent that the Greenlanders have up to now been unable to fish due to bad weather, the German high-seas fleet has fished all the more. It is not this alone that has infuriated the Greenlanders: the German factory ships have knowingly taken fish beyond their quotas almost regularly in the last several years, according to the highest-ranking Danish official on the island. The fines did not cut into the profits. More than a few Greenlanders friendly to Europe are holding the FRG at least partly responsible for the country's pullout from the EEC because of its "predatory" fishing. "The large industrial nation is exploiting the resources of a weak developing country," editorialized the editor-in-chief of GROENLANDSPOSTEN.

Yet it is not exclusively the fishing issue that has divided the Greenlanders into two camps in the discussion of the exploitation of raw materials. In Jameson Land, about midway down the east coast, significant oil deposits are presumed to exist. In spite of positive indications, it will not be known for certain whether large oil and gas deposits exist there until after 6 to 12 years of costly explorations. With an eye to the Danish motherland, it is even now being debated to whom and in what proportions these raw materials belong and how they can be transported with least damage to the environment and the fishing grounds.

In the south of Greenland there are uranium deposits, which in the opinion of many should not be developed. But Greenland is not yet master of its own house. Only recently did calculations of the Atomic Research Institute in Danish Risoe cause a stir by reporting that Denmark could supply 50 percent of its energy needs with Greenland's uranium.

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CSO: 3620/356

PAPER SEES NEW ERA FOR CENTER PARTY FOLLOWING CONGRESS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 19 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Era of 'Lines' Over"]

[Text] The two factions in the Center Party have passed into history and in their place Paavo Vayrynen is dusting off the heritage from Urho Kekkonen. The Center Party has survived the changes in society and in the nation's political leadership surprisingly well, writes Bjorn Mansson in this commentary on the unified Center congress.

Center Party congresses are really mammoth events. At this year's congress 2,680 official delegates turned up and the total number of participants was close to 5,000. Some 380 membership motions were submitted to the congress, dealing with almost everything under the sun. Democracy is functioning in the popular movement.

The congress in Nyslott showed that the party is now more united than it has been in years. It is tempting to draw parallels with the party congresses held by the Social Democrats and the Swedish People's Party. If one views unity as something beneficial, one could say that the three parties stand for stability in the republic.

As far as the Center Party is concerned the unity is undoubtedly a natural reaction to the deep splits before the 1982 presidential election. Now the two lines, those fruits of the Kekkonen era that reached their delayed maturity in the confused situation in the fall of 1981, have passed into history. At least the way it looks now, it is probably safer to add.

The unanimously re-elected Paavo Vayrynen is the undisputed leader of the party even though by nature he is not exactly a charismatic popular leader. He is now doing his best to dust off Urho Kekkonen's heritage following the Monday-morning criticism that erupted. It was certainly no accident that a few eager supporters in the field gave Vayrynen the nickname "pikku-Kekkonen" (little Kekkonen) at the congress or that he was declared to be presidential timber.

It is to the credit of the Center Party that it survived the changes both in society as a whole and in the nation's highest political leadership surprisingly well. The credit should also go to the present party leader and, as far as national developments are concerned, to his predecessor.

Although for a long time the party has not succeeded in its effort to emerge as a "universal" party, without ties that are much too close to rural areas and their trades, it has managed in an amazing way to keep its political strength almost intact since the rapid structural changes began in the 1960's.

One can also say that the party carried out an historic task of checking in this country the unfortunate polarization between a strong Social Democracy and a strong right wing that was so common in West Europe, especially in the other Nordic countries. The Social Democrats had to accept the fact that the famous Koivisto phenomenon was fairly brief and marginal and the Conservative Party now seems to be drifting around since it appears that the party's most visible political goal, its own growth, can no longer be realized. Some of the credit for checking polarization should really go to the Rural Party, but the Center Party made a valuable and often underrated contribution here.

The Center Party has also managed, in spite of some fumbling, to adjust to the transition from Kekkonen's republic to Koivisto's when the role as so-called national supporting party was taken over by the Social Democrats. The adjustment did not come about without friction and so far the Center Party has not entirely settled into its new role but it is well on the way.

The party also seems to have overcome the deep split that was symbolized by the tough struggle between the two doctors, Ahti Karjalainen and Johannes Virolainen. Furthermore party chairman Vayrynen amazingly emerged personally unscathed from his adventures in connection with the notorious compensation affair and the negative publicity it produced.

But the party still seems to be more on the defensive than on the offensive. Among other things a stronger profiling of the liberals would be in order. In Nyslott the liberals lay low, perhaps fittingly since this was their first Center congress as a member organization. But a more energetic approach is needed in the future.

But the charge of being "anemic" which our associate HS [HELSINGIN SANOMAT] leveled against the Center Party before the congress appears to be an unfair exaggeration. If it is anemic for a party leader not to have any clear challengers at the moment, most parties are suffering from this affliction. Except for the communists, of course, where the blood is flowing profusely. Names like Seppo Kaariainen, Kauko Juhantalo, Toivo Ylajarvi, Mikko Pesala and Martti Pura show that there are upcoming leadership figures in the Center Party.

The outcome of the election of the vice chairman did not justify any far-reaching conclusions on the "balance of strength" in the party. With so many people competing for the post and with Martti Pura's margin of victory being only 100 votes more than Mikko Pesala and only 50 more than Taisto Tahkamaa received, the result could just as well be ascribed to chance or to regional constellations. Although it may be significant that the old V [Virolainen] man, Heimo Linna, failed so completely and that "the last one faithful to the K [Karjalainen] line," Mikko Pesala--in spite of support from "V" people as well--was not elected. The day of the "lines" is over.

Instead of engaging in divisive personal quarrels, the Center congress is now working on specific issues. The traditional environmentalism was riding high and showed that the green color has not faded from the party. Criticism of the Environmental Affairs Ministry and its proposed new building law also showed a central dilemma in the entire environmental policy--an effective environmental protection requires a "caretaker mentality" to a certain extent. That creates friction.

The congressional resolution on nuclear power probably means that a fifth nuclear power plant will not be ordered during the next 2 years. With this opponents of nuclear power won an important partial victory. But the statement that there is "no need" for a fifth power plant leaves the door open a crack. If a need for electricity can be demonstrated statistically, where would the Center Party stand then?

The position of the Center congress on the government issue was not new although some nuances can be detected compared with earlier congresses. They prefer the present government base but could also conceive of a non-socialist coalition government with the Conservatives. If nothing else the second alternative is advanced to remind the Social Democrats of their mortality. But one thing is clear--no majority government can be formed without the Center Party in the foreseeable future in this country. A Social Democratic-Conservative coalition seems unlikely, to put it mildly. Therefore the Center Party can without exaggerating speak from a position of strength.

It appeared from Paavo Vayrynen's statements about the government's power position that the Center Party feels "overrun" by the Pekkanen agreement and the legislation the agreement calls for. Vayrynen stressed that the government cannot function as simply a kind of national mediation board in relation to the rule of the organizations. This criticism of the corporative tendencies in the nation's power structure was quite in order, not just from the point of view of the political center but also in principle.

In comparison to the support for the Center Party--and especially the liberals--in the 1980 municipal elections the unified Center Party appears headed for a loss in this fall's municipal elections. It can be psychologically wise to prepare the rank and file for this, as Vayrynen did on Sunday's TV news broadcast, so that their hopes are not set too high.

But in the somewhat longer run the party's chances of asserting itself are not bad at all. One of the momentous questions for the future is whether the party can succeed in keeping its grip on the second generation of urbanized rural residents. The Center Party has done fairly well with the first generation.

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CSO: 3650/242

BRIEFS

FIRMINO MIGUEL POSSIBLE CANDIDATE--Close colleagues of Professor Mota Pinto are reported to have been assigned by the leader of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] the task of studying the terms of the invitation to Gen Firmino Miguel to accept candidacy for the presidency of the republic. There is no confirmation in Buenos Aires that Dr Francisco Balsemao had been approached with regard to serving as national representative of the PSD candidate. It is said in political circles that Gen Firmino Miguel would be assured of strong support of his candidacy from the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]. According to reports from a reliable source, it would not be impossible that Dr Azevedo Soares will assemble the national committee on the candidacy. It is quite possible that some representatives of the Socialist Party would support the candidacy of Gen Firmino Miguel. If such should be the case, the "Ex-Secretariat" group will be able to declare its preference for Mario Soares as a candidate. It has not been confirmed that Dr Mario Soares has considered postponing his visit to Japan after learning of the availability of Gen Firmino Miguel as a presidential candidate. However, he is quoted as saying: "And a military man who was my minister!" [Excerpts from the column "Expressly Confidential"] [Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 9 Jun 84 p 2] 8089

AIRPLANES FROM PRC--The arrival date of the first Chinese airplanes to the General Office of Aeronautical Equipment has not been set. The planes will be sent to the Portuguese maintenance department. [Excerpts from the column "Expressly Confidential"] [Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 9 Jun 84 p 2] 8089

CSO: 3542/60

INONU INTERVIEW ON OCCASION OF FIRST SODEP CONGRESS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 26 Jun 84 p 6

(Interview with Erdal Inonu, SODEP Chairman, by Isik Kansu; date and place not specified)

[Text] SODEP Chairman Erdal Inonu, elaborating his views about the First Grand Convention of SODEP, due to start on 6 July, said they "did not want to see the formation of factions."

In the event that cliques are formed, joined by bonds of selfish interest, the clashes among these groups and conflicts over hegemony would render the party less effective in its dealings with the outside world, said Inonu. He added: "The elections at the Grand Convention will not give a semblance of disunity." SODEP Chairman did not comment upon the attitude he plans to take in the upcoming convention. Asked a question concerning his candidacy he retorted that it is "something that would be announced when the time comes." Inonu did not expect any changes in the doctrinal principles of the party during the convention, while noting that he expects to see "an animation and self-confidence arising from the sense of togetherness with the party's grassroots organisation."

Drawing attention to the importance of the convention as the first such occasion since 12 Sep 80, Inonu elaborated his views:

"Among the parties that were founded after the resumption of political activity, SODEP is the first to hold a national convention. According to the law regulating the activities of political parties, a political party is administered by its founders in a somewhat provisional fashion until the first national convention is held. After the party organisation is set up the relaying of demands and the formation of the new leadership is made possible only through the national convention. After the convention the Founders' Council is disbanded and the party leadership is chosen by delegates coming from provincial and county conventions. In this way a party is said to rest firmly on its popular base around the country. That is why according to the Law Concerning Political Parties, the national con-

vention constitutes the most important stage in the process of founding a political party. Therefore we think it very important that the convention takes place. Thus in line with the democratic spirit, we have decided to hold this convention as soon as possible. We do not see any signs of preparation for a convention among other parties. I am of the opinion that this should be seen as yet another instance, another evidence of our commitment to democracy, as we have been from the very beginning."

Becoming Whole with the Grassroots

SODEP Chairman Inonu gave the following answers to CUMHURIYET's questions:

[Question] Do you see SODEP Grand Convention as merely a changing of the guard? Or, will there be a revitalization within the party afterwards? Will new doctrinal principles be introduced at the convention?

[Answer] It is not proper to view it as the changing of the guard. The present leadership may be adopted by the convention, or there could be a change. Both outcomes are possible. But whatever happens, the leadership that will emerge will be one that would have become unified with the grassroots. I do not expect any prolonged discussion over the party program. There may be some proposals concerning party regulations, because there are obvious signs of preparation. Thus leadership will emerge which will have been unified with the grassroots, and which will be representative of the party organisation. Thus both party regulations and party program will have been approved by the convention. All these could well constitute a spring board for SODEP. Every national convention will give a new impetus to the party derived from days spent with the grassroots. I do not expect doctrinal changes, because the party organisation was set up in full awareness of the program. Up until now, there has been no serious demand to change the program. Therefore rather than a change in principles, I expect to see a new vitality to arise out of the unification with the grassroots, and a self-confidence, an attitude which signals readiness for greater tasks.

[Question] Within that framework can you say that the present leadership has been able to fulfill its duties?

[Answer] Yes. One evidence for this is the convention itself. There is a reason why other parties have yet to complete their preparations. Holding a convention means that one has secured the support of the party's grassroots, and to have established the joint working procedure with the organisation. Therefore, within the framework of your question, I conclude that the party leadership has fulfilled its duties so far. Every leadership has its faults. Every leadership tries to realize its objectives by wrestling with problems. I do believe that the Founders' Council has been able to establish the party by overcoming extraordinary problems, and to put its organisation into place, coming out of the local elections quite successfully.

Factions

[Question] It is a fact that certain groups or factions appear before every convention. Instances of these have been encountered at SODEP provincial conventions. What will your attitude be with regard to various groups and factions at the grand convention?

[Answer] I have already stated that the party central administration has been completely neutral during the provincial conventions. I have made it clear that we expected local organisations to enter the competition for serving the party in the spirit of democracy whether it is provincial conventions, the election of local leadership or the election of delegates. Our whole concern was with proper democratic procedures, and the elimination of bias.

The elected delegates will constitute the central administration at the convention. Naturally in every political party, in a convention of 800 delegates like ours, there will be many groups. Some people know each other better, some are intellectually or socially in tune with one another. It is natural that there are such groups. What is called faction, however, is something beyond that. It is the forming of cliques in order to establish dominance in the party administration, leaving ideas aside. It is the manipulation of private interests in the attainment of that objective. I am against the formation of such cliques. The party HQ is against it. I believe that any party member who wishes to see the party develop in a sound manner would be against it, too.

We do not want to see such factions created. I believe that the party rank and file share this view.

The elections at the convention for central administration posts will not give an appearance of disunity. I believe that our friends possess enough awareness to avoid that.

[Question] It is said that at the pre-convention caucuses you will declare, "let everyone compete according to their own rules."

[Answer] It will not be proper to say anything about my attitude since the chairman will also be up for election at the convention.

[Question] Will you be a candidate at the convention?

[Answer] I cannot say anything about it because this is something that should be divulged at the appropriate time. I cannot say just now.

12466
CS0: 3554/263

BIRAND ON BACKDROP TO HALEFOGLU'S FRG, EUROPE TOUR

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 26 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by M. Ali Birand]

[Text] It is the first time a Turkish foreign minister has paid an official visit to a West European country since the transition to democracy and the civilian government was sworn in.

The political significance of (Vahit) Halefoglu's visit to Germany last week lies in, however symbolic, Turkey's efforts to expand the scope of its external relations, presently oriented to the Middle East and Eastern Europe, towards Western Europe (relations had been suspended for some time) and to improve Turkey's public image.

It is very appropriate that Germany has been selected the venue of the first official visit. The German government seemed to concur with the significance of the visit. This was manifested during the dinners in honor of the Turkish foreign minister, and during other hospitable occasions.

This is the visible aspect of things. Messages were exchanged during the official discussions behind closed doors, which were of some interest.

1 - For Germany, the most important aspect of the visit was Turkey's renunciation of "free circulation of workers" secured by Turkey within the framework of the EEC agreement, expected to be operational by Dec 86.

In the prevailing context of unemployment Germans found it inconceivable that from 1 Dec 86 onwards 6.5 million Turks might stream into the country, luggage in hand looking for employment, and settling in Germany upon finding a job. They have been demanding since 1976 that Turkey should renounce its entitlement to free circulation of workers. FRG Foreign Minister (Hans-Dietrich) Genscher had discussed this issue in 1982 and 1984 with (Kenan) Evren, and (Turgut) Ozal, respectively. His purpose had been to bring the issue to an end by reaching an agreement with Turkey "on the bilateral plane."

During the recent meetings a consensus was reached. Turkey succeeded in making Germany agree that free circulation is an issue which should be considered within the framework of the EEC rather than treated as a bilateral matter. In exchange for this, Germans were told that while our entitlement to free circulation "could not be withdrawn" altogether, it could be "postponed for a certain period." We were told by German officials that they were satisfied with the "guarantee given by Turkey with regard to free circulation."

Well, what is being received in return?

2 - Having agreed to the postponement of free circulation (with the proviso that the issue belongs to the EEC framework), Turkey gave out a signal to the effect that "it is time our relations with the EEC should receive a boost."

In other words, in the upcoming EEC Council meeting (where the postponement of free circulation is to be discussed), Turkey wants to see that the whole gamut of political relations are reviewed, and a resolution passed to take Turkish-EEC relations out of the freezer. Germany should use its influence within the EEC, pull the others behind it playing the locomotive role. If the postponement of free circulation is really wanted then the 'freeze' should be ended.

Bonn adheres to the view that the relations should receive a boost, though no promises could be made at this stage, and no commitments were made.

3 - The reason for this is the "human rights" issue which is still being sensitively monitored by the German public opinion and parliament, as well as the Common Market Commission, some of the member countries, and finally the European Parliament. Genscher dwelled upon this issue in his speech. Drawing attention to the sensitivity of the German public over this issue, he indirectly underlined that they expect Ozal government to fulfill their "pledges concerning human rights" as mentioned in the government program, and in various speeches.

The Bonn visit made it quite clear that Turkey would have to wait for a while for any change in relations with the EEC. Even by optimistic estimates little movement is expected on this front until the first half of 1985.

This week Halefoglu visits Italy. However, more important than any of these are the internal developments in Turkey. Some of the events in recent weeks were hardly the sort that would help relax the reluctant attitudes in the West.

To the attention of interested parties: Turkey did not ask for financial help from Germany. It remained content by inviting German banks and German capital. As to the Cyprus problem, it was not touched at all due to time constraints.

12466

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SOCIAL, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 'GUEST WORKER' RETURNEES

Tradition, Modernization at Odds

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 1 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "Anatolia Has Much Patience; Turkey Between the Modern and Islamic Retrospection"]

[Text] Half a million Turks live here and hundreds of thousands are waiting to join them. What happens "deep inside Turkey" has become part of German domestic policy. Nina Grunenberg describes Turkey's problems in a three-part series.

Ankara, May 1984--In the "Konak," a nice, small city hotel in the old part of Istanbul, a few steps from the "Blue Mosque," unsuspecting guests are roused from their sleep at dawn by a noise that makes their blood curdle. The cause are wild, rough, archaic cries that seem to resound from the depth of the Asiatic steppes and at once wreck the peace of the luxury hotel. To European ears it may sound like the howling of a pack of wolves going in for the kill. But they are sounds coming from human throats; the morning song of the Turkish prisoners in the prison next door.

The vista from the upper-floor hotel window permits a view over the wall of the prison terrain over which the prisoners in prison garb are rushed in columns, sometimes marching, sometimes in double time. They have to drill as if they were recruits, throwing themselves on the ground, jumping up, continuing to run without interrupting their fighting song. This drill is customary in the country's military prisons.

A Turkish friend who hears of the experience soothingly says that only small-time thieves and criminals are in the prison. But why the word "only"? Different from former years when the friend readily commented on all open questions and "cultural misunderstandings," this time it is evident that he does not want to continue the conversation on this topic. Prison and torture are officially taboo.

Turkey has changed. The change can be explained not only by the rule of the generals. Three seizures of power (1960, 1970, 1981) have sufficed to give

their action in public life the appearance of normalcy. For the majority of the Turks the observation still applies that in the years of the undeclared civil war prior to 1981 they had gone through worse. But in the meantime the military clearly conduct themselves as partners of the republic, no longer only as its guardians appointed by Ataturk, the founder of the state. The arrogation of the generals demands its price and it is being paid from the account of their credibility. Furtively stories are told that high officers lately are using their official cars to have their children brought to school and the wife to a coffee klatsch. A year ago that would have been unthinkable. Such small matters indicate that the military are no longer the paragons of virtue as they claimed to be when they assumed power.

A feeling of reserve moreover is difficult to shake off and it cannot simply be explained by the many indications of Turkey's return to Islam. For the past few years the cupolas and minarets of the mosques are sprouting from the soil like mushrooms after a warm rain. No plausible answer can be found to the inquisitive question where the funds came from to pay for the magnificent places of prayer by the Turks who are chronically suffering from their debts. "Donations" is the uncommunicative answer, but also "the Saudis." Some conversation partners openly admit that, for the sake of the oil, Moslems and their economic and financial power, they would enter every mosque if it helps their business. A few months ago, State President Kenan Evren paid an official visit to Riad and also visited the holy places in Mecca. In a photograph, Foreign Minister Halefoglu, the long-term Turkish ambassador to Bonn, could be recognized during the pilgrimage around the Kaaba--events that would have caused political earthquakes in laicistic Turkey a few years ago. To Ataturk, the prophet was nothing but a "dirty and lying Bedouin," whose religion he wanted to exorcise from the Turks by force. Fifty years after his death, the strength of his reforms no longer suffices to prevent Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, a devout Moslem, from not only kissing the state flag in the election campaign but subsequently also the Koran.

Turkey's return to Islam had long been heralded. Since the mid-seventies, this movement was also advanced politically by the "National Salvation Party" of Nettetmetin Erbakan, which participated in government in changing coalitions. The military did end the reactionary activity of the party when it demanded the abolition of the separation of state and mosque. However, the religious revival of the Turks was not much affected by these events. It had other origins from which it drew its strength.

A few years ago Turkish women were hiding behind their head scarf only in their Anatolian village or in Berlin-Kreuzberg, but not in Ankara or Istanbul--cities with millions of inhabitants with a thin but trend-setting educational elite, an economic bourgeoisie and a civil service who, proud of their western metropolises, had as little interest in Anatolia as the erstwhile dignitaries of the Sublime Gate.

This picture, too, has changed in the meantime, not because the interest has become greater but because Anatolia is spreading West and has brutally invaded the big cities. The population of Ankara increases by 100,000 a year and of Istanbul by as much as 200,000. The bulk of the newcomers are peasants from

Anatolia who throng to the cities in hope of a better life--frequently illiterates who have nothing in their heads except for the Koran. With their wives, the head scarves and veils also conquered the metropolises. These Anatolians and their way of living are the most impressive proof of the fact that the mass of the Turkish people are rooted in the value system of the Islamic tradition despite Ataturk's secularization.

Practically Gagged

After all that, the public discussion on girls' clothing was hardly any surprise. It was triggered in connection with the 19 May celebrations commemorating the start of the Turkish liberation struggle. "Religious circles"--as a source identification this formulation is of recent date in Turkey--had objected to the short skirts of the girls and demanded plus-fours on a compulsory basis. The dispute was so played up that the education minister had to settle it personally. His compromise proposal: longer skirts similar to plus-fours.

Islam also gained political ground in the field of education. The Koran schools are booming even in the big cities, not only in the countryside. In time for the long school vacation period, which is now starting, these religious schools have opened their doors. The offer suits many parents very much. : "Then the children are kept busy at least during the day," it is put half apologetically. The fertile soil the hodjas will find for their ideas in the huge slums of Istanbul and Ankara can only be guessed.

Is Turkey's slogan once again: "Ex oriente lux?" "You Europeans misunderstand it all," a Turkish friend said angrily. In the past he had always felt hurt when Turkey's sense of belonging to Europe was even faintly doubted. He and his ilk can only recognize a strategy for political survival in re-Islamization: Islam is the handle by which the Turkish government opens the doors to the markets and financiers of the Near East. They consider the idea that the separation of church and state can be a subject of discussion as far-fetched. Islam lacks the personalities in Turkey for such a move. "We have no Khomeini," they say. "The tolerance practised by us for centuries as regards religious questions leaves no room for fanatics. The mosque may have influence in the village but not in the metropolises." Turkey's laicism, raised to state doctrine by Ataturk, possesses the value of a creed which is impossible for them to doubt.

The change in Turkey is most clearly noticeable in the fate of the intellectual elite. To the West European Turkey was the bridge between the cultures--the West by education and political ideas more oriented toward the East. Contacts with the members of this stratum were always easy. They knew foreign languages, frequently had studied abroad, in the United States, in France, in Germany and politically all had the same big goal: to stop and turn around the seemingly inexorable "degradation process" of their country. They did not want any of Islam. Most of them rejected pork only for hygienic reasons. When Khomeini assumed power in neighboring Iran and all the world nervously asked whether the fundamentalists were knocking at the door in Turkey, too, they first had to have their fathers explain to them the religious persuasion to which they belonged: "You are a Sunni, my son." They heard this with a sense of relief, since it meant that they were "no neurotic Persians."

Many of them had been imprisoned once prior to 1981. This is almost part of the biographical data of an intellectual in Turkey. The first ones were imprisoned in 1960 and the next ones in 1970. Most of them got away with nothing more than a fright. Then they went on as if nothing had happened. The submissiveness with which they took and accepted their fate gave an inkling of a century-old art of survival. But this time things did not go so lightly.

For three and a half year they have been virtually gagged. Censorship but also "bannings from professions" issued by the military take care of that. Many of them are still in the prisons and are serving "reflection penalties" as they are ironically referred to: They were punished for their way of thinking, not for their actions. Whoever has not been arrested has withdrawn from circulation, has gone abroad or lives secluded in his own niche.

Of course, they have not yet lost their courage. A few days ago, a petition in the name of 1,256 intellectuals--artists, writers, actors, journalists, professors--was handed over in the offices of the state president and of the president of the parliament in which restoration of democracy and an end to human rights violations were demanded. It was the first intra-Turkish protest that was legally made public.

The command offices of the state of emergency apparently were unprepared for that. They reacted unsure of themselves. First they banned the printing of the petition, later on they permitted the comment by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal on the petition to be printed. In his weekly routine press conference, the prime minister had made use of the question by a Western correspondent to critically deal with the petition and moreover to prove slyly in this manner "that democratic conditions do prevail in Turkey." In answer to the question of the journalists whether they were permitted to quote him, Ozal answered: "Let us wait." His comments were released for publication the same day. Since the comments alone sounded strange, the petition was also released for publication the following day. CUMHURIYET, a leftist-liberal newspaper, which honestly and courageously tries to stay on course, immediately printed the text, other newspapers only excerpts. The following day reprinting the petition was banned once again. The military department of public prosecution started an investigation and first interrogations. The Anatolian Press Agency reported that all 1,256 signers were to be interrogated.

The incident permits conclusions regarding the delicate balancing act in which Turkish democracy has been since the "alliance of the army with the nation," so labeled by Turgut Ozal. Despite the parliamentary elections last November and the municipal elections in March, both of which ended in a surprisingly clearcut vote for Ozal and his team, it is difficult to say who really has the power in the country. In the center in Ankara the civilians may govern, but in 54 out of a total of 67 provinces, the state of emergency is still in effect. There the military call the shots. In the remaining 13 provinces, martial law was replaced by an emergency law, which grants the governors powers similar to those of the martial law commandants. In place of the military courts, the state security courts spread fear and terror there.

The prominent Turkish journalist Orsan Oymen analyzed the situation in his country as an expression of an "undecided dispute over an inheritance" between democratic politicians and the military. "The Turkish republic has been founded from the barracks," he said. "The military have laid the cornerstone of this state and have always considered themselves to be co-owners. Ataturk and Inonu did take off their uniforms later on but they never stopped distrusting the civilians." For that reason, too, the Turkish generals have not by a long shot swallowed the return to democracy. In addition, in the meantime they have to defend privileges for themselves and for the army, of which a poor Anatolian does not even dare dream: adequate pay, inexpensive apartments, vacation homes, their own purchasing organizations. Their standard of living is far removed from that of the average Turk. People notice that but apparently there is no open criticism.

It remains unforgotten that the army returned an element of constancy to the life of the people, which it had lacked for years prior to the 1981 coup. In the eyes of the Turks, who are smitten with authority, the military remain the guardians of order. In this connection there is little concern over the fact that the structure of the problems which drove many into terrorism was not changed in any way or changed for the better by the generals--either economically-socially or militarily-security-policy-wise or ethnically. Instead they hope with childlike trust for the miracle man Turgut Ozal whose entire political philosophy is based on the optimistic premise that the rest is simple as long as the economy is in order.

Drastic Measures With Risks

With an unparalleled drastic cure Ozal tries to achieve economic stabilization for Turkey. He will hardly regret the fact that the labor unions at present have hardly any possibilities for action and cannot defend the interests of the workers. The measures which he adopts are part of the classical repertoire of a stabilization policy that restrains domestic demand by a tight-money policy and wants to revive exports. Germans concerned with social policy would get tears in their eyes: Ozal's market economy is truly "free." It has no social cushion in any direction.

The only ones that are jubilant are the entrepreneurs who consider themselves strong enough for this risk. The measures instituted by Ozal for the liberalization of foreign trade were described as "psychological earthquake" by them. He cancelled foreign exchange control regulations that had been in effect for 30 years. Turkish businessmen are again permitted to possess foreign currencies. In the past this was considered as a serious crime that was punished by imprisonment. Everybody may go abroad as much as he wants to. In the past private persons were permitted to cross the Turkish border only every 3 years. Exporters received considerable tax incentives. Imports were also liberalized and foreign direct investment facilitated. This was regarded as "revolutionary" for the fact alone that the memory of the humiliations suffered by the declining Ottoman Empire because it had left itself to the mercy of foreign businessmen continued to be alive in the minds of the civil service. Thus far they have always known how to make life agony for the foreign investors regardless of the promises made to them by the respective politicians.

There was little enthusiasm for Ozal's approach among the big state enterprises. With his liberalization measures he tried to pull down the protective walls behind which in the past they have been able to sell their qualitatively inferior goods on the domestic market relatively without competition. The Turkish middle class, too, cannot have much use for a policy that only favors the strong. It is true, the middle class theoretically would be able to convert Ozal's new ideas very quickly into gross national product. But the middle class has trouble with the inflated interest rates. The small entrepreneurs are unable to obtain credits that they need. Ozal has not yet fallen flat on his face but the burdens which his policies have placed on the Turks have left their mark. Unemployment is estimated at 25 percent, it is probably higher. More than 50 percent of those gainfully employed are engaged in agriculture. Seasonal work or helping out in the field is regarded as gainful employment there. In recent years, prices have increased considerably more than wages. Real income of the Turks has declined by 10-15 percent a year.

Thus far the reduction has been tolerated. Many city dwellers get their food-stuffs from their old village. The extended family, in which the total income counts, cushions social hardships and carries along unemployed members. There is no hunger but in many Central and East Anatolian areas the diet is too one-sided. It consists of bread and a kind of wheat bran but lacks fruit, vegetables, yoghurt, cheese, milk, and meat.

Ozal's drastic measures entail inherent risks. Nobody knows when the Turks will have come to the last notch in their belt. The limits of their tolerance is a riddle to Europeans. Thus far the prime minister has only been able to promise that things would improve. He has nothing to show but increasing export figures and an inflation rate that has dropped from 120 percent to 30 percent, which, however, has recently been rising again (now at 40 percent). A great deal of time will pass until the little man will feel improvement. The townspeople are more critical of the economic course than the villagers, whose ability to take stress appears to be boundless. The townspeople are aware that thus far only two groups have profited from this policy: the entrepreneurs and the military. The newspapers, too, show only little restraint in their assessment of the economic development. They are commenting on the course of things with increasing bitterness.

But as long as Ozal has a half-way chance, the opposition will keep quiet not only because the generals' coup plunged its followers into a deep ideological crisis of orientation from which it has not yet recovered but also because everyone is convinced that "There is no alternative to Ozal at this time."

As a matter of fact, Turkey has no alternative to modernization, to continuation of the policy which has made it part of Europe in the course of a generation. But the lure of Asia is strong. Why sell its Moslem soul to the West when the markets, the big construction sites, the good customers are where the green flag of the prophet flies? At the end Anatolia could be the victor after all.

FRG Policy Statements Confusing

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 8 Jun 84 p 4

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "They Do not Visit for the Sake of Politeness; The Messages from the FRG Confuse Ankara/

/Text/ Turkey has become an arena of German domestic policy. Nina Grunenberg describes in the second part of her series how the activities of FRG politicians on Turkish soil burden the already taxed relations between Bonn and Ankara.

Ankara, June 1984--An episode from the German-Turkish relations: On Friday, 23 March, at 1100 hours, seven FRG politicians from the Greens chained themselves to a fence in the center of Ankara to protest against the conditions in Turkey. The ones involved were the four Bundestag deputies Gabriele Potthast, Uli Fischer, Willi Hoss, and Milan Horacek. They were accompanied by Rudolf Bahro, a member of the executive of the Greens, by Lukas Beckmann, the former federal party manager of the Greens, and song writer Kalle Winkler who was expelled from the GDR in 1982.

Two days earlier the group had separately flown to the Turkish capital, but stayed together in the "Buyuk Ankara," the top rated hotel there. There they prepared for their action. The fact that the Greens remained undisturbed confirmed cynical observers in the assumption that the reputation of the Turkish secret police is better than its performance. The seven acted as if they were at home. They invited newspaper correspondents, TV editors, and news agency journalists to their demonstration. They produced banners, bought 13 meters of chains at the bazaar, a sawblade and locks suitable for snapping shut. Only when Kalle Winkler during his first walk around the old city heard the muezzin call the faithful to prayer from a minaret, he--the GDR pupil who was still unaccustomed to international political tourism--became temporarily faint. Suddenly he realized: "Boy, you are in Asia." He immediately wrote down this insight because he had been placed under contract by the TAGESZEITUNG as a chronicler for the action (TAGESZEITUNG of 26 March 1984).

The Germans did not feel quite right, their undertaking probably was also controversial among the Greens. But the possible consequences of their adventure did not seem to have been very clear to them. "I am preparing myself mentally for a week in a Turkish jail," Winkler noted in his diary. And "For the thing that we are planning, Turkish people would get at least 10 years." The seven counted on the public not abandoning them. That almost went awry in part. When they entered the hotel on 23 March a few minutes before 1100 hours, the ZDF (Second German Television) team, which was supposed to accompany them to the scene of the action, was not there. They decided to continue anyway: otherwise it might have happened that the press statement that the Greens were supposed to issue in Bonn might have been publicized before they were in their chains in Ankara.

At 1215 hours, Walter Juergen Schmid, the head of the legal and consular department of the German embassy on Ataturk Boulevard found out from the local office

of United Press International that the police had arrested deputies of the Greens. Immediately thereafter Petra Kelly also called from Bonn: She had heard something that worried her. The way mothers call for help when their children do not come home in time for their meal from the playground.

Coolly and with concentration the diplomats switched to alert: Whoever has something to do with German-Turkish relations is used to crises. Ambassador Dirk Oncken and his staff were determined to settle the matter as quietly as possible and to return the Greens to Bonn by the next available Lufthansa aircraft. But the Turks had to be ready for that, too. Oncken immediately went to the ministry of the interior and Schmid to police headquarters.

Are They the Greens?

A platoon of Turkish police had arrived at 1130 hours at the location of the seven chained Germans. The latter were surrounded by about 50 spectators, mostly journalists. Their attempt to free the Greens from their chains succeeded only when one of the policemen found a bicycle key in the pants pocket of one of the Greens, which opened all locks. In the meantime Schmid tried to explain the prominence of the arrested to the chief of police of Ankara. Deputies are regarded as honored guests in Turkey. That is no different for the military either. The chief of police needed some time to understand the story. Suddenly his features relaxed and he asked: "Are they the Greens?: The German nodded. "Oh yes." Then the matter went quickly. The decision by the Turks to deport the demonstrators on the same day was, however, first made when the green light also came "from above." "Above" there sit in today's Turkey the martial law commanders, the generals.

"Below" only the Turkish policemen were angry. They felt that the seven had crossed the Turkish border. Moreover they had found plane tickets on them on which they had discovered the stamp "government" (probably what was involved was the imprint "GD 15," i.e. Government Discount 15 percent). Now they wanted to know whether the arrested had come to Ankara at the behest of the FRG government.

In the last minute there was also anger in the ministry of the interior. There a harsh statement by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had arrived; he demanded the immediate release of the deputies. The Turks reacted with irritation. Under no circumstances did they want the impression to arise that they had acted under pressure. Only after Ambassador Oncken was able to prove that Genscher's teletype message had arrived only after they had made their decision were there no longer any obstacles to the release of the seven.

The negotiations had lasted for 6 hours. In the meantime the Greens had gone on a hungerstrike. Apparently they thought they were already in the Turkish torture chamber. But then everything went quickly. "It went down the steps to the police bus outside," Kalle Winkler reported to his readers, "in the bus there were four soldiers with submachine guns. I am getting afraid. Was the next destination supposed to be the military prison?" No it was the airport. During boarding Gabriele Potthast asked the "guy from the embassy"--it is Schmid who stands at the bus with a prayer of thanksgiving on his lips--he

should take care of her luggage and also look after a female Turkish journalist who is still being held in police detention.

The epilogue to the German-Turkish episode follows a week later in the DAILY NEWS, the English-language newspaper of Ankara. There was a report on a party in the social column with which the bureau chief of the Turkish Press Agency bid farewell to the press attaches stationed in Ankara on the occasion of her retirement. The report ended with praise for the female Turkish staff member of Agence France Presse, who was also one of the guests. "She is really a witty person. She entertained us with a description of her arrest by the police when she observed a demonstration by the Greens from the FRG. The incident was described with so much humor that the evening passed much too quickly."

The common charge against German diplomats "on duty" in Ankara that they are fighting on the cocktail front has not been true for a long time. Since German-Turkish relations have met reality as a result of the 1.5 million Turks in the FRG and because of the German criticism of the human rights violations in Turkey, the emissaries of the Foreign Office more and more frequently rediscover themselves on the domestic policy front where they are only spectators. The field is controlled by German domestic-affairs politicians who as a rule do not pay any courtesy visits to the Turks. They come either as demonstrators for political morality or as petitioners who want to have the most varied wishes fulfilled in the name of German-Turkish friendship. Since the competing contradictory interests are in no way balanced, a search for a consensus for a sequence of priorities in the German-Turkish relationship has long been abandoned for domestic-policy reasons, there is no concept deserving of the designation "Turkey policy." Everybody operates as he sees fit and according to the level of his insight. In this respect, the Greens proceed most consistently, but also without regard to losses.

In the relationship with Turkey, they are only interested in the violation of human rights. Last year Otto Schily, Gerd Bastian, and Juergen Reents were in Ankara to personally hand over a letter of protest to state President Evren. But it could not be too personal for the reason alone that they did not announce their visit until they were already at the airport in Ankara. This action, too, was a matter of timing. A press statement had been prepared in Bonn to which they did not want to lag behind in Ankara. Subsequently Schily thanked the embassy people: "They managed us well." Undoubtedly he knew the play he had participated in. But isn't it true that the diplomats were mere extras on a stage which had not much to do with Turkey."

Since the "change," the German Social Democrats are again more consistent in their pleading for human rights in Turkey. When they were in power, they still had to weigh their statements carefully. Then they were still interested in settling the guest worker problem by mutual agreement. As Friedrich Zimmermann now, they envisaged also, e.g., a residence restriction for guest worker children over 6 years of age to create a "condition for a realistic offer of integration," as it was put then. That is now forgotten. The protests are again voiced more easily.

Most contortions are made by the Free Democrats. As liberals they have a reputation to live up to as defenders of human rights, but as party politicians they are greatly interested in counteracting Friedrich Zimmermann's foreigner policy with the help of the Turks. Thus Gerhart Baum and Burkhard Hirsch, who were in Turkey last October on an orientation trip, were unable to reach any agreement with their interlocutors on the human rights issue. But the Turks completely agreed with the FDP politicians that residence restrictions for guest worker children are unacceptable. Was there any doubt about that?

In Barracks Yard Style

When CSU Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann visited Ankara a few months ago, things were exactly the other way around. He avoided dwelling too much on the human rights question with the Turks, but he got on their nerves with his foreign policy plans. To these examples of German domestic policy on foreign soil should only be added that in Turkish eyes the CDU too, has no particular credibility either. The reason was that its relationship with the old Demirel party was too close and too one-sided.

One diplomat felt he represents fatherland and freedom, but since he has been in Ankara he has also discovered the struggle for truth. The many Turkish truths include the fact that the international protests against torture in Turkey thus far have had no reaction whatsoever worth mentioning. Silently and stubbornly the Turks move on like a herd of water buffaloes. Thus far nothing can get them worked up, not even the remonstrances of good friends. The generals, who think along the barracks yard style, lack the flexibility of politicians. Their narrowmindedness prevents them from seeing the world without prejudice. One bad relationship more or less apparently does not matter to them. Thus there only remains the hope that at least they feel themselves observed as long as the protests last.

But the German-Turkish relations are burdened by other problems, too, and are also by no means eased by the fact that the Germans as old friends have taken on the role of advocate who speaks in the circle of the West European states in favor of politically shunned Turkey. There is the security problem that requires consideration: As a NATO partner Turkey must be cultivated and courted. Now in the foreground is also the free access of Turkish workers to the German labor market provided for in the EC association treaty with Turkey. The treaty was concluded 21 years ago. In the meantime the migration movement between Turkey and the FRG--90 percent of the Turks living in the EC are staying in the FRG and 5 percent each in France and The Netherlands--has surpassed anything that had been imaginable in 1963. The Germans are now preparing the negotiating position for the EC Commission. The Turks thus far have shown little understanding for the tight spot in which they find themselves. They don't see any reason for that now, but that is also not part of their mentality: They are a people that has always accepted tribute but they themselves have never had to pay any tribute. This characterizes their style of negotiation to this day.

The Germans committed to Turkish prisons for the most varied reasons have also contributed to strains. Only in 10 out of 100 cases are little innocents involved, according to the Turkish counsel of choice of the German embassy,

however frequently they are inexperienced people who ignorantly travel to Turkey and consider smuggling as a trivial offense. Tensions have also arisen in the mutual relations on account of the Turkish returnees. They are no more welcome in Turkey than they are here in the FRG.

Dirk Oncken, the German ambassador in Ankara, will retire within a few weeks. When he takes stock of his years in Turkey, in which he acquired much respect for his staying power, he is occasionally dejected. To console himself, he picks up the memoirs by Hans von Seeckt, who was chief of the Turkey's general staff during the last 2 years of World War I. In saying farewell in 1918, he noted: "This statement closes with a bitter aftertaste, with regret...for so much work that has become unsuccessful not without German fault."

Opportunities, Envy Greet Returnees

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 15 Jun 84 pp 9, 10

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "Emina Is no Poor Woman; the German-Turks Are Received by Their Compatriots not Only With the Joy of a Reunion"]

[Text] More and more Turkish guest workers are returning from the FRG to their homeland. Most of them are bringing along a small fortune and technical skills. In the last part of her series, Nina Grunenberg describes how the returnees manage in Turkey.

It was no Orient Express nor was it the great refugee trek. "A Turkish bus, one person German," the driver reported to the Austrian border guard. For DM 200, he and his colleague, with whom he alternated driving, took us from Munich to Istanbul in 38 hours: 15 passengers, 12 of them men and 3 women. We had two returnees on board, workers of Siemens in Munich who traveled with little baggage. They had moved long ago; their wives were waiting for them in Turkey. One of them said that he has opened a shoemaker's business near Edirne, in a small town on the highway to Istanbul. The lump sum settlement that he and his wife--she also worked on the assembly line in Siemens--received amounted to DM 43,000. He was happy when he noticed that the amount of the settlement surprised me. He didn't think that it was bad either. At any rate, he had worked in the FRG for 11 years.

The others used the inexpensive trip with the bus only as a short vacation. One of the men--he worked in the Sueddeutsche Verlag in Munich in the shipping department to foreign countries--had to go to Istanbul because he had trouble with the tenants in his house: they did not pay the rent punctually. Now he himself wanted to look after things. The long summer vacations in Turkey are ahead, also for Emina, one of the two Turkish women who was traveling with her girl friend. Both come from Izmir and wanted to visit their families. Emina stressed the statement that during the summer she and her husband will drive home in a new Opel Ascona car which cost DM 35,000. She regarded travel by bus as a little beneath her station.

Emina, whose name means "white honey", was quite a character. She earns her money with the Kunert firm in Mindelheim. There she is at the assembly line

making stockings on a piecework basis. She wants to continue "working" for two more years, "then pockets full, you know?" Over the years she has become a Swabian Turk. But her environment has not only affected her German but also her attitude towards possessions and money. In the restroom of a Yugoslav rest stop she told us women: "Emina is not a poor woman, you know? and then removed the old stocking that she wore over the right wrist revealing 12 golden bracelets, goods from the bazaar, each costing DM 1,000, according to Emina. They can always be converted back into cash. That is what is most important to her. Her girl friend, too--she worked in a restaurant as a dishwasher--had gold bracelets but not so many. The German woman was urged by the Turkish women to provide for herself similarly for times of need.

For the work that these Turkish women performed they did not have to be afraid of German competition. At any rate, no one on the bus appeared to be worried about his job. Most of them had lived in the Federal Republic for 10, 12, and more years, including Emina.

Achmed had even gone to school in the FRG. Now he is 19 years old and works in a paper-mill in Dachau. Since he is a "floater" and willing to work any shift, he earns, according to what he said, DM 3,000 gross--three times as much as his friend who only works in the 1100 to 1800 hours shift. Achmed was traveling by himself, actually he wanted to go by motorcycle but his parents were opposed to that. He wants to go to the seashore, he said, because he has never seen the sea. Incidentally it came out that he cannot read Turkish but only speak it. "At home," in the Federal Republic, he reads the SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG and BILD ZEITUNG; in HURRIYET, the Turkish newspaper most widely read by the guest workers, he only looks at the pictures.

Achmed made the impression of a small nouveau riche. In Belgrade he wanted to pay for his lunch, which cost DM 10 in German money, with a DM 1,000 bill, which he pulled from his pants pocket, completely unusual behavior for Turks. From innate tact alone and from the politeness typical of them, they are incapable of such bragging. Neither the waiter nor the man in the foreign currency office knew how to make change for such a banknote. The situation was saved when one of the other passengers paid Achmed's check. The closer we got to the homeland, the more Turkish did the mood in the bus become. The music program from the cassette had started in Munich with German hit songs; now there was only Turkish music. Starting from the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border at the latest, the Turks talked only among themselves and ignored the German woman. The smattering of German that they had acquired by hearsay seemed to drop off them like lead weights.

Emina entertained the drivers for hours with stories in which the words "unemployed," "absenteeism," "employer share," "pension insurance fund," lit up the linguistic darkness like flashes: The advantages that can be derived from our social system also are a big topic among Turks. Many Germans can learn from them as far as tricks and ruses are concerned and the energy required for them. Their astonishing cunning is relatively easy to explain: As Turks they are not used to the idea that a state again gives away what it has taken for itself. Instead they have learned to take what they can get.

When during the second night of our trip Emina discovers the border sign to Turkey at 0230 hours, tears come to her eyes and she gets terribly excited. One of the drivers turns to me and says proudly and solemnly: "This is our fatherland." The travelers do not let themselves be deprived of their joy even by the two-hour border formalities, which, in their harassing thoroughness are reminiscent of GDR practices: Raise the hood, open baggage compartment, take out baggage, open luggage in the street, keep quiet, and pay duty. At the border, the guest workers, also called the "Deuschtuerken" (German Turks) or the "Deutschlaender" (the ones of Germany) for the first time are becoming the victims of the envy with which they are treated everywhere in Turkey: Their compatriots impute that they "only eat whipped cream" in the Federal Republic. But as soon as they appear in Turkey, they are charged with neglect of duty. The government in Ankara regards only that guest worker as a good Turk who does not come home himself but in his place sends the foreign currency.

My travel companions are not annoyed by all that. They would never get the idea to criticize their country. When we were sitting in a small soup kitchen on Turkish soil at 0600 hours following the border procedure, they eat with all evidence of satisfaction a tripe soup on empty stomachs--a soup that has been served since Ottoman times--after having weathered the strain; the soup is recommended especially to all travelers and drunkards as a sedative for stomach and nerves. After 38 hours of travel we arrive in Istanbul punctually at 0800 hours.

* * *

Postscript to Achmed: When a Turkish businessman in Istanbul heard his story, he was beside himself for a moment, that is how angry it made him: DM 3,000 (that is half a million Turkish lira) is earned in Turkey at best by a general director if he is good in his performance. A Turkish parliamentary deputy earns DM 600 a month. The minimum income in Turkey is DM 200. "Such a character won't work here anymore for DM 250," the businessman said resentfully. And then: "A young man who is 19 years old and has been in Turkey only twice, who does not know our mentality because he no longer speaks our language properly, who has only a broken loyalty not only to his country but also to his family, such a young man is no longer a Turk. He is a half-breed. He interrupted the shocked silence only to clearly underscore his opinion again. "These people from the second generation are no longer Turks. Perhaps they are in terms of blood, but not otherwise."

* * *

This spring, "reintegration seminars" have become the fashion in Turkey. Started by German agencies, they were supposed to help the Turks to "get the returnee problems under control," as it is expressed in the jargon. With a sincerely meant "mea culpa," the German participants in the discussions beat their breast and confessed their guilt: The Germans, they said, had not shown to be equal to the "imported social question"--they were referring to the guest workers.

To the ears of the Turks, this was an invitation to the attack: The term "reintegration" alone pained them. It is a negative topic to them. Aren't there rumors that the Germans want to send back even more Turks? And why should those be helped who have everything anyhow? Why not the others who did not have the opportunity to go to Germany? The returnee problems in particular have something to do with income differences, also with increased demands that can no longer be so easily satisfied in Turkey.

An example: The firm of MAN, which is building a motor works jointly with a Turkish partner near Ankara, was looking for a staff of 60 Turks qualified as chief foremen and section foremen and technicians from November 1982 to the end of 1983. It was reasonable to ask the parent company in the FRG for help. In the field of motor building, many Turks are employed by MAN in Munich and Nuremberg, including as chief foremen and section foremen. MAN in Turkey is greatly interested in getting back some of these people. But only 5 "German-Turks" responded to the advertisement. For most of them it was not an attractive offer.

A Turk who earned DM 1,800-2,000 in Munich or Nuremberg could only expect to get DM 500-600 in Ankara, a good wage for Turkish conditions, but compared with that even unemployment and social welfare benefits are higher in the FRG. MAN in Ankara is operated as a Turkish enterprise and its wage and salary structures are adapted to Turkish conditions.

The plans were completely wrecked by customs and foreign-exchange regulations which would have unjustly affected the "German-Turks" if they moved to Turkey. The psychological obstacles that would have stood in the way of the return would have been of no consequence whatsoever in this case: The potential returnees had wanted to know whether MAN in Turkey would be operated as a German or a Turkish enterprise. They demanded "the same German arrangement" as they had gotten to know in Munich and Nuremberg. For them that is also a synonym for justice, which follows different laws in the patriarchal system of a Turkish enterprise. In the end, MAN looked for a labor force in Turkey: they advertised for technicians--in Turkey that is a prestige occupation--who were qualified as chief foremen in Germany during a course lasting several months. The program is working.

* * *

How many Turks have returned to their homeland in the meantime?" A migration movement has existed since as early as 1973 when the oil shock first caused uncertainty among the guest workers. About 80,000 returned to Turkey every year. But the incoming migration and increase figures (births) were always somewhat higher than those of the returnees. Since 1982, this trend has been reversed. The number of returnees jumped from 81,000 (1981) to 87,000. The 1983 figure is estimated to be 100,000. In 1984, the number of returnees will increase once again. Through the returnee assistance law (Turks whose employer went into bankruptcy or who worked short hours received DM 10,500 if they returned home), which is limited to the end of June, the numbers have increased once again. Even more attractive for the undecided was the return of contributions from the legal pension insurance fund. The possibility has existed for many years

but it was connected with a 2-year waiting period. This deadline has been temporarily dropped. One of the points of controversy between the German and Turkish governments is the fact that the guest workers only receive the worker share but not the share paid in for them by the employer.

* * *

Wolfgang Gehr, trained economist, works in Turkey as a German expert. He sits in a Turkish state bank and examines credit applications from small businessmen and artisans--a program for the promotion of the Turkish middle class also financed from FRG funds. What Gehr accomplishes he does not call it "integration performance" but "pure promotion of the economy" in which competent small entrepreneurs are being helped. Wolfgang Gehr accomplishes that with much skill and intuitive understanding of the Turkish mentality. He speaks Turkish, is relaxed, and has so much humor that he does not measure everything by a strictly operational yardstick, otherwise his reviews could sometimes lead to different results. But he would then also have less success, for example in saving Husein Uysal.

The wiry little man with the big mustache had worked as a machinist in Bielefeld for 12 years when he returned to Turkey in 1980 and set up his own workshop in an industrial area near Ankara, with a drilling machine and DM 30,000 in his bank account. He liked the drilling machine dearly but it was unrealistic for Turkish conditions. Its performance exceeded the needs of all of Turkey. Moreover, there is enough cheap manpower ready to do all that manually.

Uysal now keeps himself and his 5 employees above water with a grinding machine. He is an excellent technician but his intention to produce in Turkey what he learned in the FRG led him astray. Now he is starting to experiment. As his credit adviser, Gehr watches out that he does not get stuck. Uysal is not too interested in the operational side of his business. Therefore the relations with the bank are also somewhat chilly; Uysal did not notice that he was at the edge of an economic catastrophe.

* * *

Aksaray is a small town in central Anatolia at the foot of a dead volcano. In the "Berlin-Salonu," a pizza and borek snackbar, we meet the owner. He sits together with the hodja and studies the Koran in Arabic by heart. A short time ago, he was in Mecca; the airfare was DM 3,000 and since then he is permitted to call himself a "hadji". He had worked in AEG, Berlin, for 12-1/2 years but returned to Turkey as early as 1976.

A few houses down we notice a household supply store which displayed breakfast dishes in the window. Good porcelain is hard to find in Turkey because of the lack of kaolin. The store owners, father and son, also are "Almance," German-Turks. The father, together with his wife, had worked in a porcelain factory in Upper Franconia for 15 years. During every vacation they brought goods that they obtained at a staff discount to Turkey.

We were just in time to help translate a letter from the Upper Franconia regional insurance institute (their German is not enough for that despite their long stay in the FRG) which informed the 17-year-old son that DM 3,132 was being forwarded from the pension insurance fund.

The father, too, wants to get his money from the pension insurance fund. After paying in for 15 years he would have a claim to a pension but he would have to wait until he is 65 years old. That would be another 20 years, too long for him. If he puts the DM 30,000, which he can expect, into a bank account in Turkey, at the present rate of interest he can expect 120,000 lira a month (the legal minimum wage is 25,000 lira). Another participant in our conversation is an older man who had also been in Germany, in Munich, for a long time. He said he has abundant money, a truck, a piece of real estate, a business here and there. It sounds funny, but he is not completely satisfied: "There is nothing to the women in Aksaray."

* * *

As a rule the returnees do not settle in the village whence they came but they remain in the vicinity, mostly in the district or provincial capital. Most of them are satisfied with the life of a person with independent means. They bought apartments, a house, a piece of real estate during their stay in the Federal Republic. They live from their savings and profits from speculative ventures. They may also own a taxi or a truck. Whoever opens a business or settles down as a craftsman is already courageous and aware of the risks.

As a rule, the returnees do not belong to the group that wants to be the driving force. They are simple people who have made a big jump up the steps of the social ladder and who want to reintegrate themselves in the Turkish society as quickly as possible. For a while they try to uphold some "industrial virtues" such as discipline or order. But the Turkish society is so strong and dominating that the feeble attempts of the "Almance" quickly appear to peter out.

Younger Returnees Integration Problematic

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 22 Jun 84 p 52

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "Homesick for Heilbronn; the Younger Turks Feel Like Strangers in the Homeland of Their Parents"]

[Text] In the past three issues, Nina Grunenberg reported on the political situation in Turkey and on the Turkish returnees. Her premise: It is not the returnees that one should feel sorry for but their children, the second generation. She talked with some of them in Istanbul.

For Turkish children from a good family, the harsh side of life begins with the entrance examination to a bilingual secondary school. One of these institutes that provide opportunities to get out of the language isolation and also opens up prospects for study abroad is the "Istanbul Lisesi," the German-

Turkish secondary school located in the old part of Istanbul. It has 1,250 students, boys and girls, including 150 children of returnees from Germany.

For the "Almance," the "German-Turks" as they are called not always with friendly intention, who have attended a secondary school in the Federal Republic, the "Istanbul Lisesi" appears to be ideal. Frequently their Turkish has become so inadequate that they need private tutoring when they return to their homeland. They would be worse off in a purely Turkish secondary school than at the German-Turkish secondary school.

But for the parents this school is more, it is a status symbol. In Turkey whoever has a child attending the "Istanbul Lisesi" can regard himself as having arrived. As a result of the FRG detour, even those families have made this jump to the upper classes of Turkish society who would never have gotten such ideas prior to their "emigration." But now they have possibly become so ambitious that they try to place their child in the "Lisesi" even though he has only completed the extended elementary school or the intermediate secondary school and had to stop attendance.

The social rise has its drawbacks--less for the parents: Frequently they are surprisingly satisfied with the material riches that they have gained by their stay in the Federal Republic. They also like to be back in the "fatherland." It is not they who are the sufferers of the German returnee policy but their children. Especially if they have grown up in Germany and have gone to school there, they have to get over the separation from the environment of their childhood but also the farewell from the friends--in the memory of the Turkish youths these are more often than one would believe, German friends. The distrust and the latent dislike with which they are received in Turkey affects these children more because they are unprepared for it.

"The teachers are really funny," recalled the lively Fuad. He is one of the returnee-students at the "Istanbul Lisesi." "The first thing they told us was: 'You are not as good students as the others.'" The 17-year-old Fuad simply wouldn't stand for that. He would not let anything bad be said about his Heilbronn school, especially since his old class comrades have just invited him again to visit them during the vacation. He was even more outraged when the female teacher in front of the entire class said about a girl: "She is bad, she has come from Germany."

The Turkish teachers, worried about the high quality reputation of the "Istanbul Lisesi," consider the children not only as scholastic but also as social "sideways climbers," for whom they "do not lift a finger," as a German guest teacher regretfully said. The German Turks in their eyes are also spoiled because they behave differently from what is expected of Turkish children. Instead of following the instruction obediently, disciplined and without asking questions, they are critical, frank and frequently very thoughtful if not "conscious of the problem." They stand between two cultures and collected active experiences in both--different from the parents who observed life in the FRG only from the guest worker ghetto.

Those among them who coped with this experience intellectually gain disproportionately much sensitivity and maturity. This applies to the Turkish girls in particular. As guest worker children in Germany they experienced much more of the world than they are entitled to or permitted in their "role as a woman" in Turkey. The 18-year-old Ayla, who attends the final grade of the "Lisesi," with almost tender gratefulness recalls those young German women in Hamburg who persuaded her strict parents to be permitted to give Ayla swimming instructions and to go hiking with her.

Fuad and Ayla, Levent and Selale, Serhat and Mustafa were six students from the "Istanbul Lisesi" who met with me after school one afternoon in the cafe to report on their experiences in their old new homeland. To permit Ayla and the one year younger Selale to come along, their teacher had to call the parents and ask for permission. After this hurdle had been overcome, there was only one worry left: They wanted to change their clothes before they met me. To have to go across the street in the school uniform and on top of that without makeup--use of lipstick is enough in the strict "Lisesi" to be brought before a disciplinary commission--was a horrible thought to them. Both of them reasoned that the uniform had its good sides, too: "In the morning you don't have to give much thought what to wear." Ayla even said that "for social reasons" it was good--in the uniform they are all equal--but boys and girls actually considered all uniforms equally horrible.

For the six, the uniform was the symbol of the "tyranny of the school." Critically they observed that there is "no dialogue between teachers and students," that they have to do too much mechanical rote learning and that there continues to be corporeal punishment in the school. Even though they hate beatings, they are part of everyday life in Turkey--men beat up women, officers their recruits, teachers their students. The children of the returnees no longer considered that right. But when Ayla started to criticize the problem sharply, she was admonished by the 20-year-old Serhat, the oldest among them, that she must "not run down" her country.

The 17-year-old Levent suffered most under the rigid school conditions. He was a boarding school student and had to expect that he would not pass the entrance examination for the university, which is simultaneously the final examination at the school. He has already had to repeat a year twice but he cannot starve the pressure. "My life is already ruined," he said sadly, "everything is a mess." He would immediately return to Germany if he could. He got to know it at the age of three. His father worked for Siemens in Hamburg, his mother was employed by the subway company. He himself grew up with a German foster mother. In school, too, he was always among Germans only.

Fuad did better in school, but he, too, would like to go back to Germany. What really are his prospects in Turkey? He can study after the final school examination. "We couldn't do that so easily in Germany," Ayla critically interjected. But many attend university without being able to say how they want to earn their livelihood afterwards.

For the "Almance" the idea suggests itself that they become teachers of German, a prospect that is not exactly promising: The teachers are especially poorly

paid. If everything goes wrong, Fuad reflects, he can always attend the Goethe Institute and get a diploma as a tourist guide. (The Goethe Institute thanks him for nothing: the staff does not lack good intentions, but suitable rooms).

Mustafa's thinking is similar to Fuad's. His parents still live in Berlin. They have placed their son in the boarding school in Istanbul so that he remains a Turk. But Mustafa is a rascal who knows how to get out of every tight spot. "I am a citizen of the world," he says a little pompously.

What they "consider" themselves to be is a topic occupying all six of them. "In Germany I did not exactly know what I was," Ayla said. "But here I am a Turkish woman." It was similar in the case of Selale; she, too, was told when the family still lived in the Federal Republic how a Turkish girl has to behave. Her father cited his adolescent daughter as the reason for his wish to return to Turkey: Selale was to remain a Turkish woman.

It is quite curious: Of the six, the two girls seem to have profited most and nevertheless they accept their fate easiest, the sensitive, critical Ayla somewhat more resigned than the gentle Selale, but both know how to adapt themselves better to Turkish conditions than the boys, for suffering is the fate of women. Now they, [the boys] are the ones to rebel, to complain and if they were not yet 17 years old, they would also like to cry.

They yearn to go back. They glorify the conditions under which they lived as children of guest workers so much that they do not want to imagine a future without Germany.

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ORGANIZATION, MISSION OF NAVY'S FAST ATTACK FLOTILLA

Koblenz MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German Apr: 84 pp 156-165

[Article by Capt Heinrich Schuur, commander of the fast attack craft flotilla: "The Fast Attack Craft Flotilla"]

[Text] We find fast attack craft today in almost all navies, everywhere in the world. Originally small units that were highly dependent upon the weather and that were conceived for a surprise torpedo attack against superior targets, today they have become larger, well-armed, multipurpose warships.

The German navy has decisively influenced the development of the fast attack craft since 1916. The latest example of pathmaking progress is Fast Attack Craft Class 143. The following article presents the result of this development, the fast attack craft flotilla of the federal navy.

Tasks

The basis of the NATO strategy is forward defense. It is of particularly decisive significance for the Federal Republic of Germany at the boundary between East and West, so that its own territory will not become the battlefield. It is therefore important for the navy to engage the enemy as far as possible from its own coast and to deny the Warsaw Pact every option by which it can get a foothold in the Baltic Sea entrances. Here time and space advantages are with the eastern side. For one thing, the Warsaw Pact can decide the time of attack, and for another the short distances from its coast to ours permit a concentrated, surprise attack of its forces, particularly of its large amphibious potential. This possible procedure can only be met with the help of fast, combat ready units that can react to every enemy threat and at the correct time form centers of resistance depending upon the situation.

Fast attack craft are the proper naval forces for such operations. They are highly mobile, capable of reacting, and have strong firepower. They can carry out mobile resistance, but they can also in offensive thrusts force the law of action on the enemy. By means of their mobility they can retreat from concentrated attack operations. Their small size allows them to use the wide shallow water areas of the western Baltic and Baltic entrances to their advantage and from them to carry out elastic attack and defense. The necessity for rapid reactions in adjusting to changes in the situation requires an

improvement in leadership and executive ability. This need will be met by the use of computer equipment on board modern fast attack craft.

The fast attack craft of the federal navy were specially conceived and further developed technically for the operational area of the Baltic Sea and Baltic Sea entrances. Their training and tactics are adapted to the conditions of this area. Cooperation with allies and with our own naval and naval air forces fits these requirements.

Retrospect and Development

When in 1950 in Himmerod the first considerations for a new federal navy were begun, fast attack craft, more exactly fast torpedo craft, were again an obvious constituent.

The actual formation of the fast attack craft arm began in 1956 with the taking over of six ships of the Royal Navy and of the naval forces of the Federal Border Guard. It ended after only eight years in 1963 with the commissioning of the 40th newly constructed ship, if one does not count the already expected acceptance of the seventh tender, Werra, in September 1964. The 40 new fast attack craft are connected in size and equipment directly to the German WWII ships. They did not solve the dilemma of the fast attack craft arm that had existed since 1943: tube artillery without fire-directing radar, uncertain means of communications, and above all the short-distance torpedo that went straight ahead made the fast attack craft increasingly unsuitable for their real and original mission, surprise attack against superior targets. When Egyptian "Styx" missiles sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967, it became clear to everyone where our fast attack craft stood. The modified Zobel Class -- with radar-guided artillery and wire-guided torpedos -- could recover ground in 1971 and even gain back a certain element of surprise. A larger step that was above all in weapons technology was the introduction in 1974 of antiship missile MM 38 "Exocet" with 20 new constructions of Class 148. The decisive breakthrough to a new means of naval warfare was not reached until 1976 with the commissioning of the first -- to be sure, already conceived in 1966 -- "fast attack ship" of Class 143. Together with the combination of wire-guided torpedos, antiship missiles, and radar-guided artillery on one ship, it was possible with the help of data processing to combine all the essential components of the ship and with the help of real time data processing from ship to ship to join the units of a squadron into a fast-reacting total unit.

Two modernizing measures recently in the fast attack ship flotilla formed the logical continuation of this development: first the re-equipping of all ships of Class 148 with computer-assisted position picture presentation and the capacity for real time data processing; second, the replacement of the Zobel ships, which were over 20 years old, with the same number of ships of Class 143A. The latter have a better capacity for execution in the operational area in comparison with those of Class 143 thanks to better equipment for the electronic conduct of combat and a close-range antiaircraft system that can be retrofitted. In this area at present the rearmament gaps lies in the older classes. These gaps are still to be filled.

Organization

All fast attack ships of the German navy are combined in the fast attack craft flotilla with headquarters in Flensburg-Murwik.

Under the flotilla commander are four squadrons of different ship classes. They are:

- the Second Fast Attack Craft Squadron with 10 ships of the Class 143 and the tender, Donau, in Olpenitz
- the Third Fast Attack Ship Squadron with 10 ships of the Class 148 and the tender, Rhein, in Flensburg-Murwik
- the Fifth Fast Attack Ship Squadron with 10 ships of the Class 148 and the tender, Main, in Olpenitz
- the Seventh Fast Attack Ship Squadron with a final 10 ships of the Class 143A and the tenders, Elbe and Neckar, in Kiel. (The rearmament from Class 142 to Class 143A will be completed by the end of 1984).

The Second Fast Attack Squadron was stationed in Wilhelmshaven until 1970 and has retained its (even) North Sea number in spite of its redeployment to the Baltic Sea.

While the squadron is operationally directly under the naval headquarters of the fleet commander, the bulk of the tasks of the flotilla staff lies in administration, training, and the development of tactics. The commander of the flotilla is the administrative head of about 2,300 soldiers.

Further duties are the work on tactical requirements for new or modernized weapons systems and their components, cooperation in operational and leadership principles of the fleet, as well as the maintenance of operational readiness of the materiel and logistic support in close cooperation with the Naval Support Command (MUKdo). In its Systems Maintenance Division all questions, problems, and operational data specifically concerned with fast attack ships are considered, conclusions reached, and necessary measures agreed upon with the fast attack ship flotilla.

Operational Training

Like all parts of the navy, the fast attack craft flotilla undergoes a rapid change of personnel because of the necessary rotation during time of peace as well as the constant change in draftees. Over 30 percent of the crews are draftees who stay on board between nine and twelve months -- depending upon the assignment -- and then return to their civilian occupations.

The training program must adjust to this continual change. Here it is important first of all to get the individual man used to his "workplace." He must learn how to find his way around on board, first by day and then by night; first by calm weather, then in rough seas and storms. Along with this he must learn to master his so-called second role, a role that is particularly important on small ships with their small crews. He is needed, for example, in case of fire, in damage control, and also when there is a man overboard, and in many other roles. In short, he must be a complete member of the community that only fills the ship with life by its cooperation and makes it into a functioning unit.

After this "basic training," which consists in a combination of sea and harbor duty, the unit training begins. It forms a wide area of the training program, because the fast attack ships operate mainly in groups to achieve a concentration of their own weapons, to expand their own sensors, and to support each other. The data connection that is possible for the first time this year in all ships of the flotilla over "Link 11" optimizes these possibilities and incorporates the individual ships into a unified whole that can react rapidly. Although they are divided in different areas, the units react in such a common way that they are like the batteries of a large ship that are coordinated and applied in a concentrated way.

Operational training reaches its high point in the exercises of joint actions of all naval forces. National and NATO maneuvers form the framework for this. On the background of the most realistic scenario possible, the important thing here is to work together in defense and attack with fighter bombers, helicopters, mine sweepers, and other naval forces under simulated operational conditions. The most important tasks of this training section are to bring the crews to the limit of their endurance, to practice and critique tactical operations, and also to produce a common leadership understanding at and between all levels of command.

Between these training steps there are firing courses in which both the operational ability and the mastery of the weapons is practiced and checked, and there are exercises in the Ship Safety Training Group in Neustadt/Holstein. In the light of the Falkland experiences, great importance is placed on technical combat service, that is, the maintenance of combat strength by rapid, goal-directed damage control. The crews practice this in Neustadt under the most realistic conditions possible, and here it is also psychologically important for the young soldiers to limit and put out for themselves a real fire in a real ship (here a training hulk).

Training cruises to friendly or neutral countries make up the service high point in a training year. In 1984 the rapid attack ship squadrons entered ports from Santander in Spain to Lulea in Sweden. Along with publicity for our country, their visit is also to show our defense readiness, as well as to give the young soldiers a look at other countries and in this way to broaden their horizon and to contribute to a better understanding among the younger generations.

Class 148

Full Load Displacement: 265 t
 Measurements: 47 m long, 7 m wide, 2.1 m draft
 Engine: 4 diesel motors total 8,800 kW (12,000 HP), 4 axles
 Speed: Cruising: 30 kn, Highest: over 35 kn
 Armament: Two double starters for Sea Mission-FK 38 EXOCET
 1 cannon 76 mm
 1 cannon 40 mm
 Minelaying capacity
 Equipment: Sea supervision radar, navigation radar, weapon control system, radio transmitter and receiver sets
 Crew: 30 men (4 officers, 3 junior grade NCO's, 14 NCO's, 9 crewmen)
 Commissioning: 1972-1975
 Shipyards: Amiot (Cherbourg) 12 ships
 Lurssen 8 ships (License)
 (Bremen-Vegesack)
 General Contractor: French navy

Class 143

Full Load Displacement: 391 t
 Measurements: 57.7 m long, 7.6 m wide, 2.5 m draft
 Engine: 4 diesel motors total 11,700 kW (16,000 HP), 4 axles
 Speed: Cruising: 35 kn, Highest: over 38 kn
 Armament: 2 double starters for Sea Target Missile MM 28 EXOCET
 2 torpedo tubes for sea target torpedos (SEAL-DM2A1) 1 starter for close range antiaircraft defense FK (RAM)
 2 cannon 76 mm OTO MELARA 1 cannon 76 mm OTO MELARA
 Minelaying capacity
 Equipment: Sea supervision radar, navigation radar, automated combat and information system for rapid attack ships (AGIS)
 Radio transmitter and receiver sets
 Crew: 40 (4 officers, 5 junior grade MCS's, 14 NCO's, 17 crewmen) 34 (4 officers, 5 junior grade NCO's, 13 NCO's, 12 crewmen)
 Commissioning: 1976-1977 1982-1984
 Shipyards: Lurssen (Bremen-Vegesack) 7 ships Kroger (Rendsburg) 3 ships (license)
 Lurssen (Bremen-Vegesack) 6 ships Kroger (Rendsburg) 4 ships (license)
 General Contractor: AEG-Telefunken

Operational Support

Lengthy training courses, considerations of cost, and also personnel bottlenecks forced the separation of the traditional, combined-section functions of "service" and "maintenance" crews on rapid attack ships and the establishment of a central maintenance and repair team in the squadrons. Increasingly more complex weapons systems have reinforced this trend and led to the formation in every squadron of a separate "Systems Support Group" (SUG).

On the average, 30-35 specially trained soldiers work in it. Stationed on the tender for the squadron, they have special workshops there with testing equipment, an extensive supply of replacement parts, and the documents necessary for repair -- technical service manuals, descriptions from the firm on operation.

Similarly to the central supply in an air squadron, the SUG provides for the material operational capability of the ships before and after the operation. Along with damage control and removal of disturbances, there are, above all, preventive measures on the program to protect the weapons system in good time from breaking down.


In peace time, the documentation of all disturbances, as well as the method and time of removing them is quite extensive in order to gather experience from the collected and demonstrable facts for the improvement of machines and installations and to obtain evidence on training effectiveness and to work out possible changes and operational instructions. SUG, which is available at all times, provides for an ad hoc repair, service, and maintenance that becomes necessary during operations. The high material readiness of the ships -- over long maneuver phases as well -- has proved the correctness of this method of operation.

The original worry that without the SUG the ships could no longer help themselves during an operation has faded in the face of the high reliability of the installations and systems. Let just one example be enough to show this increased reliability: In WWII a motor's operational hours were 250 until overhaul and 500 until a change of motors. Today they are 3,000 to 4,500 hours and 6,000 to 9,000 respectively, whereby per year and ship between 750 and 850 operational hours are performed, which means an average use of 100-110 days at sea.

Besides housing the SUG, the tenders keep power, fuel, oil, maintenance and ammunition ready. The resupplying necessary beyond this is accomplished with help from suppliers and tankers.

The Combined Operation

The rapid attack ship unit commander can and must use the events in the operational area such as geographic and meteorological conditions to his own advantage and if possible to the enemy's surprise so that he must accept the situation as unchangeable. He makes his estimate of the situation -- that is,



Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Flensburg | 2. Olpenitz |
| Rapid Attack Ship Flotilla | 2nd Rapid Attack Ship Squadron |
| 3rd Rapid Attack Ship Squadron | 5th Rapid Attack Ship Squadron |
| 3. Kiel | |
| 7th Rapid Attack Ship Squadron | |

Tender Rhine Class

Full Load Displacement 2,940 t
 Measurements: 98.2 m long, 11.8 m wide, 4 m draft
 Engine: 6 diesel motors total 10,900 kW (14,400 PS), 2 axles
 Speed: Cruising: 15 kn, Highest: over 18 kn
 Armament: 2 cannon 100 mm, 4 cannon 40 mm
 Equipment: Sea and air supervision radar, navigation radar, weapon control systems, radio transmitter and receiver sets
 Crew: 132 men (5 officers, 17 junior NCO's, 36 NCO's, 74 crewmen plus 35 man Systems Support Group (SUG) (7 officers, 18 junior NCO's, 10 NCO's)
 Commissioning: 1961-1964

the knowledge of number, type, and movement of the enemy -- as a condition for his decision and for the use of weapons. He does this by purposeful use of his own possibilities and by cooperation with other naval forces. Here the principle applies: The best way to success is always combat with combined arms.

The important thing for the rapid attack ships, then, which are able to make a rapid concentration of force and attack during combat, is to work together with their air forces and coastal radar organizations to obtain reconnaissance support, to increase the range of their own weapons with target data transmission, and to make a decisive effect on the enemy through coordinated use of weapons. For a successful combat operation, the tactical leader at sea must plan and supervise his undertakings, from the purposeful use of all available sensors to the estimate of the situation to the effectively coordinated use of weapons. For this he needs, among other things, qualified personnel and diverse, reliable, and rapid means of communication, that is, the ability to lead. Today the rapid attack ships have the necessary requirements for this. They make it possible for them, in accordance with their ability, to direct similar and different naval forces, to command limited naval air strike forces, above all helicopters, in a meaningful way, particularly when both units can exchange real time data. This particular quality of information exchange has already been realized with the data connection between all rapid attack ships and the MHQ of the commander of the fleet, by the way also with the NATO early warning aircraft E3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Both can give real time information on enemy ships and aircraft to the units at sea and also receive reports -- also real time -- and then if necessary send in further naval and naval air forces, thereby expanding the spectrum of combined arms.

Finally it is important also to practice cooperation with the rapid attack ships of our NATO partners, Denmark and Norway, in order to be able at all times to act in a coordinated and concentrated way in the operational area. This is the central point of the yearly "Bold Game," a series of maneuvers that has brought together every year since 1960 the rapid attack ships of the federal navy with those of Denmark and Norway (originally with the participation of British rapid attack ships, now of British helicopters).

Perspective

While the Jaguar and Zobel ships of the first postwar generation were still greatly dependent upon the weather, torpedo carriers that could only be used in the protected coastal area, our ships today are characterized by great striking power, increased endurance, and high availability. The balanced equipment with active and passive sensors, with command communication resources and data processing equipment gives them also command ability also or precisely in combination with other naval forces. With this these units provide the fleet commander with a wide spectrum of tactical capabilities and operational possibilities. They show the rapid attack ship to be a maritime instrument in marginal seas, and with further logical development it will be more and more able to make a direct contribution to the safety of our sea lanes in the North Sea as well. The ships are also suited to contribute to deterrence

in the operational area between the Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea. Their presence and readiness both in times of peace and of crisis make them a credible force. It is precisely their data connection with the MHQ of the fleet commander that makes them into highly valuable naval forces in crisis management.

Today, rapid attack ships are undeniably an indispensable means of naval warfare. Since beyond this the costs of obtaining them in money and personnel is relatively easy to cover, it becomes only too clear that the young navies of the Third World depend upon rapid attack ships for their tasks, among which are guarding their own coastal seas and the 200 sea mile depth of exclusive economic zone. And one must not consider it arrogant if it is predicted here that their evaluation will continue to grow in the future in the federal navy as well, particularly with the increased threat and reduced finances.

The soldiers of the rapid attack flotilla know the operational value of their arm and the significance of their mission; after all, many of them can look back at over ten years, many over 20 years, of service in the branch, and the principles and practice of operation for their ships is based on almost 30 years in the federal navy of continually growing experience with their arm. To be sure, only the older commanders and line and technical officers experienced the team spirit that grew and was tested in difficult operations and in all kinds of weather on the old Jaguar ships, but the enthusiasm and military pride of that time are being transmitted to the coming generations. It is because they do not want to let this tradition be broken that rapid attack ship crews do not want to give up the idea of "Schnellboot" [fast ship] even if it no longer seems to be sufficient by definition.

9124

CSO: 3620/348

REPORTED FORTHCOMING DECISION ON 'PURCHASE OF CENTURY'

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25 Jul 84 p 1

[Excerpts] It is expected that the decision for the "purchase of the century" will be made at the next KYSEA [Government Council for National Security] meeting, with the only pending matter the number of aircraft to be purchased, as well as the type or types these will be.

Nevertheless, both deputy Minister of National Defense Pafsanias Zakolikos and alternate Minister of National Defense And. Drosogiannis yesterday denied reports that the companies that manufacture F 16 and F 18 aircraft withdrew a number of offset proposals in an attempt to apply pressure in order to hasten the process leading to the ordering of the aircraft exclusively--or for the most part--from them.

However, independently of these denials, military observers expressed surprise yesterday at the manner in which 25 U.S. F 5 aircraft are to be sent to Iran through Turkey. They were not ruling out the possibility of these aircraft reaching Iran, as long as this country would cede to Turkey 36 F 14 planes, which, at this time, are grounded in Iran because of a lack of spare parts and competent personnel, in order to pressure Greece into ordering the aircraft.

Speaking to newsmen yesterday about the "purchase of the century", Zakolikos stated that the government is including this expenditure in its five-year program and is not aiming at increasing the power of its air force, but at maintaining its superiority, through the replacement of the planes, which will be gradually grounded as the new ones are received.

In an attempt to justify the delay in reaching a decision, the deputy minister said that the government is conducting a thorough investigation of every aspect of the offset proposals, so as to avoid the consequences of hasty purchases made by previous governments, for which "we are paying and shall be paying for years to come." Referring specifically to these proposals, he stated that the government is trying to achieve two goals; 1) assistance to the specific weapons systems that will be ordered, so that Greece will be less dependent from the manufacturing countries, having undertaken the manufacture of some of their parts, and 2) entrusting part of the work to several Greek firms (EAV [Greek Aircraft Industry], EVO [Greek Arms Industry], PYRKAL [expansion unknown]), so that they will expand their activities to international markets.

READINESS TO FACE CHEMICAL WARFARE STRESSED

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 9 Jul 84 p 5

/Text/ Athens --The Greek armed forces are presently prepared to not only decisively confront any possible chemical warfare attack on any part of the country but also to answer with more of the same if necessary!

This was evidenced during chemical warfare maneuvers that took place in the First Army's region. Purpose of the maneuvers was to coordinate actions necessary to protect the population and also to see to it that the army is capable of continuing its military operations without distraction.

Nevertheless, in order to accomplish this mission it is first of all indispensable that there be practical experience in the use of chemical warfare substances and in confronting them in all phases of their utilization by any possible invader.

By special invitation, doctors of all branches of pathology and surgery, chemists, physicists and other scientists in this particular field took part in the maneuvers.

The primary goal of the maneuvers was to train scientific units working with the armed forces to operate under conditions of such warfare and to confront situations that would rise because of such warfare.

Estimates by the general staff lead to the conclusion that every army today, even though it may lack advanced conventional weapons, can utilize chemical substances against its opponent as an alternative desperate solution, as was recently noted in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict.

From the first conclusions of the recent maneuvers the overall capability of the armed forces to protect the Greek people and territory from a chemical warfare attack was demonstrated. Also, their capability in bringing chemical warfare to the very heart of the enemy with more powerful means.

Contrary to the use of all other weapons the release of chemical substances requires a whole series of intensive preparations that can easily be spotted by modern electronic surveillance methods.

Weather conditions that permanently prevail over Greece --this is mentioned in the staff specifications-- do not favor a large-scale chemical warfare attack since strong winds usually blow from the north toward the east, i.e. to the enemy's surroundings. These dissuasive conditions necessarily limit a chemical warfare

attack to certain battle zones only with the use of explosive weapons, artillery shells, mines and even hand grenades.

Moreover, it is considered unlikely that enemy submarines would launch self-propelled floating gas canisters toward Greek mainland coasts since countermeasures against them are made easier for the Greek forces.

Generally-speaking, an examination of the facts show that because of the prevailing weather conditions and the advantageous deployment of Greek forces at frontier posts a headstart in retaliation under the most effective conditions is assured. In the eventuality of a paranoic action in advanced areas, mobile decontamination teams manned by specialized scientific and technical personnel would very quickly undertake the decontamination of the area, soldiers and materiel contaminated by chemical substances.

Every mobile team can decontaminate 80-100 men an hour. The latter could then return at once to their combat units.

5671

CSO: 3521/307

POLITICAL DIVISION OVER TRNC FREE ZONE PROPOSAL

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 26 Jun 84 p 12

[Text] Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's announcement last Friday (exclusive to our paper) that the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) will be turned into a free zone" has become the most widely discussed topic in Northern Cyprus. President (Rauf) Denktas defended the idea of a free zone, and thought the issue should be debated and resolved as quickly as possible.

Our Cyprus correspondent reports that Ozker Ozgur, chairman of Republican Turkish Party (RTP), voiced opposition to the idea of TRNC becoming a free zone saying that "Cyprus will be turned into a colony of the monopolies of the world." Raif Denktas, secretary-general of the Social Democrat Party (SDP), who also happens to be the son of the President, thought that the issue should be referred to the people's opinion.

President Denktas, answering journalists' questions yesterday, said that measures against inflation, and the free port and free zone issues should be discussed in depth. He added:

"Free zone is a proven and successful economic enterprise. Countries with sparse natural resources attract capital from outside by taking certain economic measures. Offering incentives to investment they open up new fields of business. Due to tax exemptions everything is produced cheaply, thus trade increases, tourists increase, economic activity is accelerated, and business opportunities expand."

Denktas referred to the Greek Cypriot venture into 'offshore banking' which may be considered a partial move towards a free zone. He noted that during the period following 1974, the Turkish community has tried a closed, semi-etatist regime in commerce and economy, and that this model has meant regression for the community.

Pointing out that inflation is largely imported from Turkey via the Turkish currency, Denktas said:

"If we could attach a certain TRNC value to the Turkish monies that we use, and control the comings and goings of money in circulation and the channeling of investments in Northern Cyprus, through the agency of the Central Bank, we might stay out of the inflationary developments in Turkey."

Ozker Ozgur, chairman of RTP, asked for permission to speak at the morning session of the Constituent Assembly. Referring to Ozal's announcement that the TRNC will be wholly declared a free zone, he said: "This is a decision taken jointly by President Rauf Denktas and Prime Minister Turgut Ozal. The President does not have the authority to take decisions of this nature."

Ozgur pointed out that "opening the TRNC to the multinational monopolies of the world would lead to the collapse of the community's value system." Arguing that the national economy will be 'multiplied with nought' with the TRNC turning into an economic outpost where multinational corporations do as they please, Ozgur said: "Under the hegemony of the multinational corporations Cyprus will become a colony of global monopolies." Ozgur called the government and the constituent assembly "to oppose the colonization of the TRNC."

Raif Denktas, secretary-general of SDP, demanded that the constituent assembly dissolve itself and early elections be called in line with existing regulations, presenting the constituent assembly with a draft resolution to that effect. As he was explaining his views with regard to the TRNC becoming a free zone, Raif Denktas proposed that the issue should be submitted to the public's judgement, and that a resolution should be passed to that end.

12466
CSO: 3554/262

FOREST INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS DEBATE NEED FOR SPRAYING

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 21 Jun 84 p 10

[Article by Kjell Westo]

[Text] The new law on controlling underbrush with herbicides is overdue. Long overdue. Parliament has managed to effectively bury the whole controversy over controlling underbrush in the Agriculture and Forestry Committee.

Why? The decisive factor is that there is strong pressure in parliament in favor of tightening the legislation. This would result in a total ban on aerial spraying and would probably also contain severe restrictions on spraying from the ground.

But this opinion stands in sharp contrast to the government proposal.

Difficult

For some the situation is a painful one; it is already the second time the government has submitted this legislative proposal. Will the representatives of the government parties again refuse to approve the bill--along with the opposition?

The situation is most difficult for CP [Center Party] members of parliament: it is their own man (Agriculture and Forestry Minister Toivo Ylajarvi) who bears the ultimate responsibility for the government proposal.

The background is this:

In March the government sent parliament a bill that would have given municipalities the right to decide for themselves about spraying from the air. Nothing was said about spraying from the ground.

The bill is almost identical with the one parliament received last August. That bill was withdrawn in October when the sentiment in parliament proved to favor more severe restrictions on treating undergrowth with herbicides. Most parliamentary groups felt that a tougher proposal should be drawn up.

The March proposal (like the earlier one) calls for shifting the right to decide on aerial spraying to the municipalities.

Under current law municipalities do have the right to allow aerial spraying. But if they want to prohibit it approval for the ban must be sought from the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry. Last year the municipalities of Suonenjoki, Karttula and Sodankyla, among others, had their requests for a ban turned down.

But in reality the new law leaves the ultimate decision-making right with the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry: those turned down by a municipality have the right to appeal to the ministry.

Two Counter-Proposals

When the government presented a bill this spring that was almost an exact copy of the last one--despite the strong opposition in the fall--the reaction was fairly predictable. The proposal was sharply criticized during the full parliamentary debate. And the criticism did not stop there--to date two counter-proposals have been presented.

One of them, which has the backing of Green representative Kalle Konkkola and has also been signed by representatives of all the government parties with the exception of SFP [Swedish People's Party], calls for a total ban on controlling underbrush with herbicides. This includes spraying from the ground.

The other, which was drawn up by the parliamentary environmental group, proposes that the right to decide on ground spraying also be transferred to the municipalities. It does not mention a total ban.

There is a third possibility. SFP parliamentary group chairman Ole Norrback has said that the SFP group is prepared to ban aerial spraying altogether but that ground spraying against the wishes of a municipality might be possible.

Crossroads

Right now it seems likely that the matter will not be decided until after the fall municipal elections. The question is a sensitive one and the decision could be a guide for environmental policy in the future when bigger and more far-ranging environmental and conservation issues have to be dealt with.

It is generally thought that either the environmental group proposal or the Norrback proposal has the biggest chance of passage; the government bill is too "wishy-washy," but it is not thought that a majority would vote for a total ban either.

Forest Ownership

Around 25,000 private owners own a total of 64 percent of the country's forest area. The Central Forest Board is the administrative organ.

The state owns 24 percent of the forest area. The forests come under the Forestry Board.

Businesses own 8 percent of the forests. They come under the Central League of the Forestry Industry.

The remaining 4 percent is owned by municipalities, communities, societies and so forth.

Industry, Environmentalists Disagree

There has been a conflict for many years over how to remove brush, the medium-sized vegetation that makes forestry difficult and obscures the visibility on highway curves.

We must use toxic substances, it is often the cheapest way, say forest owners and industry.

No, that destroys the environment and upsets the balance of nature, reply environmentalists, adding:

"Besides it does not even pay financially."

That is how the conflict looks today in a nutshell. The demand for profitability is opposed to a "green" ideology, money is opposed to human values.

"Industry and forest owners are behaving very pigheadedly. There are lots of studies that show that controlling brush with toxic substances is both harmful to natural resources and economically unprofitable," fumed Ilkka Tuormaa, information secretary for the Conservation League of Finland.

Have Experience

Forester Matti Oksanen of the Central League of the Forestry Industry replied:

"Why don't people rely on the forestry industry's more than 20 years of experience? We have seen for ourselves that there is no lasting damage from spraying! And incidentally why would industry choose to operate in an unprofitable way?"

Oksanen was backed up by chief inspector Simo Halonen of the forest conservation division of the Forestry Board:

"A total ban on all chemical spraying would place the entire forestry branch in a difficult position. Just think how freely chemicals are used on farm acreage: it is a strange contrast that they want to ban such a well-supervised activity as the spraying of brush."

Private forest owners agree with this, according to section chief Jan Heino of the Central Forest Board's forest cultivation division. "Although many forest owners are skeptical about chemical control methods the general opinion is probably that it is best to retain the opportunity to use chemicals, at least when it is both economically and practically difficult to use other methods."

Illogical Forestry

Thus it is mainly the economic aspects that the various forest owner groups present in defense of the spraying program. But Ilkka Tuormaa of the Conservation League of Finland countered that. According to him there are a good many studies that show that spraying brush not only harms natural resources but is also uneconomical.

"Nor are herbicides a small separate thing, they are part of a forestry that is being run illogically. Brush, for example, grows and spreads most rapidly in clear-cut areas. If there was not so much clear-cutting, there would not be that much brush either.

"The forestry industry pays no attention to the ecological characteristics of different areas; everything is done according to the same formula," Tuormaa charged.

Thus one contention stands against another. That leaves the studies. Science has had several decades in which to find answers to the two main questions:

1. Is it economically profitable to spray vegetation?
2. Do herbicides do permanent damage to nature?

Uproar

There was a big uproar around these questions in the spring when newspapers revealed that the Forest Research Institute in Helsinki refused to publish a research report on chemical control of brush. The research report is a compilation of around 100 studies.

Forester Olav Lyly rewrote his report five times before he gave up--his employer, the Forest Research Institute, claimed and still claims that Lyly's work was unscientific. Sweden published the entire report in the prestigious publication TEMPUS under the heading "Poison in the Forest: Should 'Inconvenient' Research be Stopped?"

What conclusion did Lyly reach in the survey? That the profitability of chemical control of brush remains obscure since the effect of spraying on logging activities has not been studied.

Production Decline

On the other hand, Lyly wrote, there are many studies that confirm the destructive effect of herbicides on the forest landscape:

The production capacity of forests declines in sprayed areas; among other things one study showed that the ratio of damaged trees was twice as high in sprayed areas as it was in unsprayed areas. Another study showed that there were ten times as many dead trees in sprayed areas.

Herbicides affect the breaking down of forest waste, thus reducing the supply of plant nutrients.

Lowgrowing vegetation was harmed. One study showed that the lingonberry crop declined 95 percent and the blueberry crop 99 percent the year after treatment. It was not until 3 years later that berry plants began to recover.

Animal life disappeared. Grouse disappeared entirely in one area studied. The number of breeding birds was cut in half in another. The number of hares and moose was cut in half after spraying--the reason was the lack of food due to the effect of the poison.

Thus Lyly's conclusion is simply this: spraying herbicides on brush is economically unprofitable since nature's productive power is diminished. Another conclusion is that there is clear documentation for the harmful effects of the chemicals.

Exaggeration?

What is the response of forest owners and the Forestry sector?

"Scientists can write what they want to, but the industry knows best, at least when it comes to profitability," said Matti Oksanen of the Central League of the Forestry Industry.

And what about damage to nature?

"The dangers are exaggerated. I have personally inspected areas that we sprayed in the 1960's. Today there is nothing to be seen! It is true that things look ugly for a few years after spraying, but nature restores the balance."

Simon Halonen of the Forest Board shares that view:

"The spraying is carefully supervised. Besides, the toxic substances break down naturally," he said.

But Ilkka Tuormaa of the Conservation League of Finland wanted to see proof of that:

"We would like to see the proof the industry and forest owners have that poison does not harm the environment. And it is not Lyly's fault that all the studies (the oldest of which is over 30 years old) point to extensive damage. His report was a compilation, after all. It is irresponsible to casually dismiss his research."

In the heated debate over Lyly's study the Forest Research Institute is not trying to find a middle ground. People there are still cool when it comes to the report itself.

"It does not meet scientific criteria. The observations in the studies quoted by Lyly were made over a much too brief period of time," said institute director Kullervo Kuusela.

Jobs

He is sympathetic to environmentalists' demand for a total ban on herbicides ("They have their ideology"), but said:

"Since it is generally accepted in Finland that forestry provides a livelihood for many people shouldn't we give forestry the same conditions as we give agriculture?

"Many people obviously think that forests are an independent environment that should not function on terms set by human beings. But for those who cultivate the forests it is important to do so in the most productive way," Kuusela pointed out.

Since people in the forestry sector do not believe that herbicides are unprofitable it is natural that profitability and productivity are the main arguments advanced for continued spraying of herbicides. They want the same conditions as agriculture.

If a total ban on herbicides is approved by parliament, the forestry industry estimates that expenses will be increased many times over. Controlling brush through clearing alone would be hopelessly expensive, they say.

"Just remember, this would presumably involve tens of thousands of hectares and the extra costs for clearing would be hundreds of marks per hectare--that's a lot of money," said Matti Oksanen of the Central League of the Forestry Industry.

"A total ban might not lead to an immediate catastrophe, but in the long run production would decline markedly," agreed Jan Heino of the Central Forest Board.

Members of Parliament Caught in the Storm

Thus it is an important decision in many ways that parliament must make when members decide on changes in the brush control law this fall. There are three possibilities: permit aerial and ground spraying to continue but allow municipalities to ban aerial spraying; a total ban on aerial spraying; or a total ban on all types of spraying.

When this decision has to be made representatives must steer between the heated demands of environmentalists for a total ban coupled with a generally "green" public opinion and the forestry industry's demand to be allowed to pursue operations in a profitable way.

"If brush spraying is banned it would be a step in the right direction. I hope parliament will at last get up the courage to do this so that it can eventually move on to more important environmental issues, acid rain, for example," stressed Ilkka Tuormaa of the Conservation League.

Lying Low

Aerial spraying of brush has declined markedly in recent years. As late as 1977, 32,000 hectares of forest were sprayed from the air while the figure last year was only 2,000 hectares.

This year three or four big companies, including Enso-Gutzeit, allegedly had plans for aerial spraying but held off "in order not to provoke public opinion." All forest owner groups said they were "waiting until the new law was ready."

Ground spraying, especially spot spraying, was usually combined with clearing cut areas.

According to Matti Oksanen clearing combined with spot spraying is the most common brush control method used by lumber companies just now--the method represents 70-80 percent of the companies' brush control program.

Spraying from tractors is also done as well as spraying foliage from the ground.

This year the state is planning to use herbicide on 17,500 hectares out of the 73,000 hectares intended for treatment. The rest, about 65,000 hectares, will be cleared.

There is no overall survey of spraying plans by private and company forest owners.

6578

CSO: 3650/242

LAPLAND PLAGUED WITH CONTINUED HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Thomas Olander]

[Text] Unemployment hangs like the sword of Damocles over Finnish Lapland. Out of a total of around 200,000 people, 10-13,000 are constantly out of work.

There are around 90,000 people who are able to work and about a third of them go to labor offices each year to get help. Every other family in the entire county, which covers a third of the total area of Finland, has been affected by unemployment in one way or another. Within the family there are always some relatives who are unemployed.

And the bleak statistics show that the state or municipalities provide jobs through so-called employment measures for just as many people as there are with no jobs at all.

Another 10,000 people have seasonal jobs--jobs they have to leave during the off season.

In other words, there are times when a third of the 90,000 able-bodied workers are unemployed.

Very Little to Do

"There is little opportunity to do anything about the problem since forestry, agriculture and the traditional industries are reducing their work force; at least it will not be possible to deal with the employment problem in this century," said county governor Asko Oinas, who resides in Rovaniemi.

"In the past we tried to solve the problem with traditional measures, with road construction and the like. But the need has diminished and now machines have also taken over those jobs," Oinas pointed out.

"That kind of work has lost its significance."

The Labor Ministry's district chief in Lapland, Taito Maatta, expressed the same view.

"We cannot expect the state to concentrate on this and on investments in the future either. There is an economic boom now and this means a tightening up of monetary policy," he said.

Oinas said straight out that "we have no chance of reducing unemployment," but Maatta was not quite so drastic in his statements.

"It is true that I am pessimistic, but we must try to do everything we can."

Special Characteristics

Unemployment in Lapland has some special characteristics. In many of the communities on the border with Sweden it is close to 20 percent. According to Maatta this is because of the Finns who have traditionally worked in Sweden. But the situation in Sweden has tightened up in recent years--for example the crisis at the LKAB mining company had repercussions in Finland. Many people have returned home to look for work. Another crisis area is the eastern regions on the border with the Soviet Union. There they have been waiting for a number of planned state projects that were not carried out. Plans to construct a large artificial lake have been shelved because of environmental considerations and the plans for a phosphorus mine have not progressed.

"Obviously these plans aroused great hopes. When they were not implemented they undoubtedly buried other projects along with them," Maatta said.

Many Reasons

There are many reasons for unemployment. Depression and paralysis gripped Lapland in the 1960's and 1970's, for example. At that time almost 20,000 people moved out--homesteads were deserted. Today there are more people from Salla in Sweden than there are in the relatively large border community to the east.

An attempt was made to halt the emigration with traditional measures--but over the years big industry, forestry and wood processing as well as farming have increasingly lost ground in the north. Machines have taken over more and more and profitability is not too good. Of Lapland's five mines one will soon be shut down, three others are balancing on the thin edge of profitability and only one is doing well at present.

Villains in Southern Finland?

Many people in Lapland would put part of the blame on the decision-makers in southern Finland.

"With the establishment of many national parks in northern Finland, we have lost close to 2,000 jobs," rumbled the former town manager of Rovaniemi, Tuure Salo, who is known for his criticism of the authorities far away in southern Finland.

He was seconded by county governor Oinas.

"Almost 25 percent of the annual growth in all the Lapland forests occurs within the areas the national authorities, under pressure from environmentalists, have preserved, thus removing them from logging operations," he said in a criticism of Helsinki. Oinas underlined the state's importance as the owner of land and forests as well as being the owner of almost all the big companies in Lapland.

"But many objections can be made--Lapland is very special and what is suitable for the rest of Finland is not necessarily good for Lapland. For example this means that we always have higher unemployment here than they have in the rest of Finland."

Oinas also mentioned a special Lapland project that was started up in 1976-80. The project is now beginning to bear fruit with the formation of a large number of small industries. But these small businesses have been unable to absorb the labor that has been forced to leave the big firms.

"What we need now is a decentralization of the decision-making process. Let the inhabitants of Lapland decide what to do with the money provided by the state," said Oinas.

"In this way one could activate the region's own forces, which has not happened so far because the money has come in small chunks earmarked for specific projects."

Taito Maatta also had the same idea--let the inhabitants of Lapland dispose freely of the funds in the way they consider best.

Maatta also gave an example that shows that some changes in attitude may be occurring.

Recently the labor authorities issued a detailed study of the complex problem of unemployment. The Lapland viewpoints played a very central role in the study. The study, which is radical in its arrangement, stressed the need to break the cycle of mounting unemployment. While in 1980 Lapland had an unemployment rate of 11.2 percent, the figure was 15 percent at the beginning of this year.

Down to 10 Percent

"If we continue at the same rate, we will have 20 percent unemployment for the entire county by the end of the century," Maatta predicted.

"We must now make an effort to provide jobs for young people. If the project that is now being discussed by various organs becomes a reality the upward trend will change to a downward one," Maatta said. The study talks about trying to reduce unemployment to 10 percent--which would happen by redistributing the funds that are already available.

Among other things the report mentions giving Laplanders disposal of the money that the big Kemijoki power plant company pays to the treasury, where it disappears into the budget mill.

The proposal, which would involve quite a few changes in the state budget where Lapland is concerned, also contains a number of other radical suggestions. If it does not get the green light in Helsinki it is possible that some of the positive psychological climate that exists in Lapland in spite of everything will disappear to be replaced by a repetition of the inertia and hopeless despair of the 1960's.

Despite the alarming unemployment figures people now often talk of a pioneer spirit in Lapland and there are strong hopes that this will survive.

Waiting for Jobs

"Young people would rather wait for work here than look for jobs somewhere else, a large number of people have moved back. In the last 2 years immigration has been larger than emigration for the first time in years, the net population has increased by 1000 people and that is a lot where Lapland is concerned."

6578

CSO: 3650/242

DARK ECONOMIC OUTLOOK ASCRIBED TO PS/PSD GOVERNMENT

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 7 Jun 84 pp 1-2

[Editorial]

[Text] The great difficulties which the coalition government of the PS [Socialist Party] and the PSD [Social Democratic Party] is about to undergo are the fault of the government itself, not of the opposition. In fact, the latter has not shown that it is capable of bringing down Mario Soares and Mota Pinto, despite the dialectical offensive of one of its components (that of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]) and the street attack of another (the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party]). The CDS is about to ready itself for the next decade and the PCP, in spite of all its financial resources, was unable to fill more than half of Palace Square Saturday (150,000 persons, who came from all points in the nation on trains and chartered buses).

The PCP also failed to persuade the public not to acquire the passes for mass transportation facilities, despite the fare increase, with the result that the situation in this area is normal. This is the nature of the very government that is daily committing suicide as it continues to make one mistake after the other. What is more, the alternative to its incompetence is not to be found in the opposition. Any average observer knows that the alternative to this government is to be found in the person of the president of the republic. When the PS/PSD government falls, Gen Ramalho Eanes will dissolve the legislature and appoint an administrative government. At the same time, he will call for a referendum to decide if the next regime is to be parliamentary or presidential, requesting authorization to modify the constitution accordingly. Once the vote of the people has been obtained, the constitution will have to include authorization of the presidential regime and general elections will be held. Ramalho Eanes will be a candidate at the head of his party, which had its origin in the CNARPE [National Committee to Support the Reelection of President Eanes] and with the support of the 25 April Association, of the Damiao de Gois Institute and of other organizations of the kind, and in this way a new republic will be initiated.

But if this government persists in the mistakes it is about to make, the president of the republic will be able to dissolve the legislature before July of next year, dismiss the government and call for a referendum. It was not by mere chance that Ramalho Eanes alluded to the idea of a referendum in

connection with his decision on abortion. The president's advisers would like to demystify the idea of a referendum in the presidential area, so that they can make use of it without hesitation as soon as it seems necessary to the change of regime. The tactic was a total success: the abortion law was approved as was the wish of the forces of the Left (with which the president does not want to break his ties in view of future general elections) and the referendum became transformed into one more institution within the easy reach of Ramalho Eanes, so that he can make use of it without restriction in dealing with the slightest criticism. Therefore, at the present moment, the president of the republic is favorable to the referendum and can make use of it in whatever way and at whatever time he may choose, now that he has given it legitimacy in connection with the abortion law.

The Portuguese are right when they say that there is no record of a country's disappearing from the map. In fact, the political survival of Portugal is assured, which does not mean that its independence is guaranteed. There are those who persist in their idea that foreign powers (and Spain, in particular), want to see a Portugal that grows progressively weaker, so that they can manipulate it at their pleasure. We have been brought to think this way by the present coalition. Since Mario Soares and Mota Pinto did not take the great basic steps during the summer of last year, the delay has become fatal. According to the observations of experienced economists, it is already too late to remedy the discreditable situation in which we find ourselves. Mario Soares in particular was unwilling to listen to those who wanted to help him. In many instances, he did not even see fit to answer the letters they sent him. Seduced by the advice of the neo-Marxists of his party, he was conciliatory and gave in. He did not apply the basic measures when the deadline arrived, which, as we have said, was the summer of last year. The internal forces of opposition in the parties of the coalition gained the ascendancy. One month ago the parliamentary expeditions of his party destroyed his projects in Lagos. Last weekend came the fatal blow: the National Board of the PSD repudiated the government. The Social Communication apparatus, especially that of the state, in a massive and continued, implacable and impetuous action, is chipping away at the state ministers and secretaries every day, especially at the image of the two "leaders." Items of good news are not reproduced on the state radio or television, nor in the state newspapers. The government has been isolated and left thrashing its arms about in a sea of bad news, as we predicted when we learned of the maneuvers (which were also unhappily stupid) of Almeida Santos to keep the enemies of the coalition alive in the organs of the state Social Communication apparatus. The isolation has become more pronounced around an executive who had an historic opportunity to save democracy in Portugal and to lead the Portuguese people to a more worthy and prosperous life. Now we are a year behind schedule. It was during the summer of last year that the government, under the stimulus of a recent success in the elections, should have enforced the new rent law; a law on the information and domestic security services; a law on the Unemployment Fund; a law on the return to private ownership of the nationalized enterprises of the IPE [expansion unknown] and other nationalized enterprises such as all of those that make up the Social Communication apparatus of the state.

This is how the government should have acted to prevent the creation of unbearable situations like those which have already become irreversible. According to a statement made by Professor Cavaco Silva at a meeting of the National Board of the PSD last weekend, the losses of the state public enterprise sector in the last three years reached the astronomical sum of 125 million contos and this without taking into account the subsidies that were assigned to it. The losses of the state Social Communication apparatus alone last year (and therefore in a single year) exceeded one half million contos (to be precise, 548,000 contos). The great depression hit the Portuguese economy with full impact. According to the OCDE [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], investment in Portugal will decline by 6 percent during the current year and unemployment will affect 12 percent of the active population. The gross national product will show a negative growth of 2 percent. There will be a 5 percent drop in salaries and a decline of 25 percent in private consumption. A study of the development analysis of the Portuguese economy during the year 1983 (last year), conducted by the Institute for Analysis and Situation Investigation and Planning Studies (IACEP), [reveals that] there was a 4 percent drop in real salaries; a growth of only 1.7 percent in the industrial sector, due to energy production alone; that the construction industry was stagnant, with the result that the goals set by the great options of the plan were no longer feasible; that agricultural production declined by about 10 percent, with a relative effect on wine and oil production; that there was a 27 percent increase in unemployment in comparison with 1982, and that there was a reduction on the order of 57 percent in the inclination to invest in comparison with 78 percent in 1982. According to other indicators, tourism may experience a decline in 1984. The depression was already becoming more prevalent in 1983 and it was necessary to bring it to a halt. The banking institutions were already in trouble. The resulting financial conditions of the various banks were not encouraging and the Banco de Fomento Nacional [National Development Bank], for example, resorted to issuing bank bonds and bonds with a higher rate of remuneration and terms of three years. To provide an adequate food supply for the country, the government could find no other means beyond, for example, the importation in 1984 of 70,000 tons of fish.

Mario Soares took somewhat the same route as that followed by Balsemao: he hesitated and failed to realize that there was but little time left in which to save the country. He repeated the mistakes of the past and now he wants to try to correct what is by this time difficult to correct, now that irresponsible individuals typical of such situations are beginning to emerge within the PS and the PSD. From the economic standpoint, the government has almost no alternatives. To check the rise in prices (inflation), it sends the budget deficit sky-high; to avoid the budget deficit, it increases unemployment; to check unemployment, the balance is off; when the balance is secured, the result is a decline in investment; when investment declines, unemployment increases even more.

The IMF, a delegation of which is in Lisbon, fills us with shame, when it again asks the government: "What has Portugal done to reduce the deficits of the public enterprises?" Professor Cavaco Silva answered this question somewhat as follows: it is preferable to put 500 workers of an enterprise under

the protection of the Unemployment Fund rather than to create unemployment for them and for 500 additional workers and so on. But these measures could have been taken last summer. At the present moment the social situation is explosive. Instead of talking about returning the public enterprises to private ownership, the government says it is going to restructure them. The government did not assume liberalizing posture, which is the only posture that can save the economies that are not the property of the state, Mario Soares tried to apply a mixed solution, part capitalist, part socialist, allowing himself to be dominated by the neo-Marxists of his party, failing to keep them at a distance and so creating the abyss in which Portuguese life is again submerged. In the face of the situation that has become apparent in the last few days, the economic specialists pull back again and ask each other: "Can the coalition continue to exist? Will the PS and the PSD be able to reach an understanding? What will happen in the next two months?" In the meantime, investment is shrinking, as usually happens in all situations in which confusion rather than confidence takes over.

8089

CSO: 3542/60

EEC STEEL POLICY VIEWED DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST SPAIN

Madrid ABC in Spanish 2 Jul 84 p 42

[Article by Andres Garrigo]

[Text] Brussels--One of the most difficult battles of Spain's entry into the European Common Market lies ahead on the iron-and-steel front. The latest position of the EEC demands that Spain apply its criteria to reorganization of the sector and poses the threat of continued restrictions on Spanish steel exports in the years ahead.

Spain is not alone in wanting to join Europe: The EEC is anxious to penetrate Spain with all of its products. Whence its proposal for an accelerated tariff reduction during the first two years, establishment of the value-added tax, the change in the patent system and the adoption of coordinated Community legislation.

For the 12 Community iron-and-steel giants, the Spanish market with its 38 million consumers is an exquisite prize. Those 10 [sic] groups produced a combined \$75 billion worth of products in 1981-1982. Comparatively speaking, the output of all Spanish iron-and-steel companies in 1982 was only \$5 billion, 1/15th the amount.

This means that if there is a threat, it is not, as Brussels claims, a threat posed by Spain to the EEC, but rather, the European oligopoly to the over 40 fragile and small Spanish enterprises. One must not forget that at the present time, the Spanish iron-and-steel sector must limit its exports to the EEC to 757,000 tons, while the Community can sell to the Spanish market as much as it wants. Prolonging this imbalance after membership is unjust, but that is what the EEC is trying to do.

Growing concern in the Spanish sector is reflected in a confidential report from the UNESID [expansion unknown] representative in Brussels, Juan Antonio Riviere. The report states that "when one adds to the threat of the potential Community exporter the fact that in the early years of membership, they should try to impose limitations on the production or production capacity of Spain's iron-and-steel industry, then Spain's industrial development could be checked as a result of the fact that it would not have a suitable range of products."

In order to understand the magnitude of the threat, one has to realize that the Community now exports some \$95 billion worth of semi-finished products, machinery and transport equipment. This presumes a total eight times higher than that of steel exports of finished products.

The latest negotiating document of the EEC reflects its obsession over the reorganization of each of the Spanish iron-and-steel enterprises. All would have to present "detailed reorganization plans" to Brussels as soon as possible.

After obtaining the transparency of the Spanish sector, the EEC wants to "initiate discussions rapidly" of three points: predictions of trends in the iron-and-steel market between now and 1 January 1986; the type, extent and duration of public aid to the sector (banned in the EEC after 1 January 1986); and production capacities (of plants) to be maintained, reorganized or done away with, along with the final anticipated capacity of the Spanish iron-and-steel industry.

11,464

CSO: 3548/288

SURVEY OF IMPROVED DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME

Madrid ABC in Spanish 2 Jul 84 p 41

[Text] The REVISTA DE HACIENDA PUBLICA ESPANOLA, published by the Institute of Fiscal Studies, has just issued an article by Angel and Julio Alcaide Inchausti on the distribution of personal income in Spain in 1980. The study, like those for 1967, 1970 and 1974, was based on the results of the Surveys of Family Income conducted by the National Institute of Statistics.

Distribution of Income of Spanish Families by 10-Percent Groupings (percentage of family income available attributed to every 10-percent group of households)

	<u>1a</u>	<u>2a</u>	<u>3a</u>	<u>4a</u>	<u>5a</u>	<u>6a</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>8a</u>	<u>9a</u>	<u>10a</u>
1967	1.33	3.03	4.20	5.52	6.64	7.73	8.39	9.72	12.12	41.32
1970	1.44	3.13	4.31	5.29	6.42	7.90	8.59	9.90	12.26	40.76
1974	1.76	3.18	4.47	5.11	6.34	8.04	9.06	10.09	12.38	39.57
1980	2.41	3.98	5.20	6.31	7.48	8.80	10.01	11.53	15.05	29.23

Source: Personal distribution of Spanish income in 1980. Angel and Julio Alcaide Inchausti. HACIENDA PUBLICA ESPANOLA

The study of both statistics consisted in adjusting the results of the fiscal studies to the amounts of family income available, based on national accounting methods. As we know, the studies contain gaps with respect to family spending on durable goods, luxuries and that done outside the home. There is also a marked discrepancy between data on family spending and income, which reveals -- contrary to national accounting projections and what common sense would recommend -- that Spanish families regularly spend more than they make.

Results of the survey show a total change in the distribution of personal income in Spain, with the Gini index dropping from .2071 in 1974 to .1294 in 1980. (The maximum concentration of income -- that is, if all income were in the hands of a single family -- yields the index figure of 1, while an equal distribution among all families yields an index figure of 0). A Gini index figure of .1294 is equivalent to a model of European distribution similar to that of France or Italy.

By distributing family income available by groups of ten -- that is, by calculating the percentage of income assigned to 10 out of every 100 families, ranging from the lowest to the highest -- it turns out that in 1980, 10 percent of

those families with the lowest income level absorbed 2.4 percent of total income, while the 10 percent with the highest income level received 29.23 percent of the total income available to Spanish families that year. These figures were respectively 1.76 and 39.57 percent in 1974. Obviously, the effect of redistribution of Spanish income in the years of economic crisis from 1974 to 1980 was far-reaching. It can therefore be said that Spain has joined the model of developed European countries, achieving a high degree of fairness in the personal distribution of income.

Sociologists and probably many politicians will feel satisfied with these social gains long desired by election programs. But economists will be left with the tremendous uncertainty of the correlation that might have existed between the improvement in the personal distribution of income in Spain and maladjustments that result from going to an unemployment rate of 3.17 percent in 1974 to 11.79 percent in 1980 and 18.07 percent in 1983; from a level of net national savings equivalent to 16.1 percent of the GNP in 1974 to only 9.4 percent in 1980 and 7.5 percent in 1983; and to a public deficit that was no such thing, but rather, a surplus, equivalent to .18 percent of the GNP in 1974 and an actual deficit of 2.01 percent and 5.91 percent of the GNP in 1980 and 1983 respectively.

The interdependency between improved distribution of family income and an increase in the public deficit can scarcely be doubted, since the main cause of the growth in the deficit was the increase in social transfers from the public sector. With respect to the decline in savings, attributable to the improvement in distribution of family income, it would be partially explained by the greater propensity to consumption on the part of low-income families. The drop in savings checks private investment and investment is essential in creating new jobs.

What has happened in Spain with the sudden improvement in the distribution of family income is proof that in economics, as in so many other aspects of life, what is best is the opposite of what is good. We have improved tremendously in the distribution of personal income, but economic problems have been created that have led us to an unemployment rate of 20 percent now seen in Spanish statistics. (Bilbao Bank Studies Department)

11,464

CSO: 3548/288

ILICAK SEES LITTLE FUTURE RELIEF IN OZAL POLICY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Jun 84 pp 1, 10

[Editorial by Nazli Ilıcak]

[Text] The contents of Prime Minister Ozal's 'breaking-the-fast' dinner were reported in the papers yesterday. Ozal articulated the 6-month record of the government, and its look to the future. As far as we can see, inflation is still problem number one on the agenda. To combat inflation, more stringent measures will be taken if need be, and monetary policy will be tightened further.

Meanwhile, the sharing of hardships by everyone is expected to be taken as a signal of Motherland Party's fairness. In this context the prime minister is heard saying: "Everyone is complaining, workers, employers, tradespeople, peasants. This means we are distributing hardships fairly, we are on the right track."

Of course, one should aim at distributing prosperity among the masses. God willing, one of these days we will hear the prime minister speak words of a developing, growing Turkey where it is prosperity rather than hardship that is being fairly distributed.

When the prime minister said that the domestic and external prices of many basic commodities have been brought to the same level, our journalist friend Mehmet Barlas could not resist himself from commenting, "It may well be that prices of goods are brought to the same level in countries where per capita income is \$1000 and \$10,000 respectively. Yet incomes are not being brought to the same level."

It seems that time is expected to take care of the issue. According to Ozal, the position of the workers and public officials had worsened during the high inflation period of 1976-1980. Their situation will be gradually improved by non-inflationary measures. With inflation coming down the rapid erosion of salaries will be prevented.

According to Ozal's calculation the cost of living has not increased much relative to 1983. If the inflation rate of the last four months of 1983 is extrapolated to twelve months, the resultant figure would be 62 per cent. That means that Ozal has taken over a 62 per cent inflation rate. Since inflation during the last four months of 1984 is conjectured to be a monthly rate of 2 per cent, it means that the overall inflation rate under the Ozal government would be around 25 per cent.

Of course, we are unfamiliar with all these calculations. However, we are overly familiar with the forbidding prices at the greengrocer, and the anxiety of the people who can barely survive till the end of the month.

An Optimistic Scenario

The prime minister has drawn a very optimistic scenario. The realities, however, are not in keeping with that scenario. There is widespread discontent around the country. But who knows, maybe we are wrong, maybe our diagnosis is wrong.

To wait and see is the best policy. Maybe one day the continual erosion in the value of Turkish lira, and the successive price hikes will come to an end, and our people will experience the joy of sharing prosperity rather than hardship.

12466
CSO: 3554/265

OVERVIEW OF FIVE-YEAR PLAN AGRICULTURAL GDP OUTPUT

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 26 Jun 84 pp 1,7

[Text] Agriculture's share in GDP will be lowered to 15.5 per cent as the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan calls for new measures to increase productivity and production, envisioning 3.6 per cent growth. The 1984 annual program envisioned agriculture's share in GDP to be 17.7 per cent, while during the period of the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan it had hovered around 22 per cent. However, it is not thought possible to reach the envisioned growth rates with current agricultural policies.

During the Fifth Plan period, the rate of increase in agricultural production is set at 3.6 per cent. This is predicated upon a 3 per cent increase in crop production, 4.7 in animal products, 3.1 per cent in forestry products, and 7.7 per cent in aquatic products. However, the prevailing view around the Ministry of Forestry & Village Affairs is that the programmed rates of growth cannot be accomplished with the current agricultural policies.

In the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, the growth in agricultural production had been targeted 5.3 per cent. It was subsequently found that the actual growth rate had been 2.2 per cent on average. While forestry products recorded a 2 per cent drop, the increase in crop production was 1.6 per cent, in animal products 4.1 per cent, and aquatic products 17.5 per cent.

Crop Production

The targets for crop production have not been set in a realistic manner. Even if it were possible to implement all agricultural projects as programmed, the annual production increase from 1985 onwards could not be more than 1.8 per cent.

In the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan crop production is targeted to increase by 3 per cent annually on average to meet the total demand. However, even with such efforts to increase productivity and production the projected increase is not expected to top 1.8 per cent.

The reduction of fallow lands might mean an additional 1 million hectares each year to come under production, though its actual contribution would remain at 0.6 per cent. Furthermore, the 'second harvest' project (which is aimed at establishing the practice of multiple harvesting) would increase production by no more than 0.1 per cent. Moreover, while the 'second harvest' project could not increase production at programmed levels, about 70 per cent of the program has been realized in any case. Officials at the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Village Affairs maintain that the significance of these two projects lie not so much in increasing production but in giving guidance to the farmers. For the officials, the most effective project that can be employed to increase production is the transmission of agricultural knowledge, and the applied research project. But the goals envisioned in these projects cannot be realized before 1990. These projects will increase production by 1.7 per cent. Even if we were to assume that crop production will increase by 1 per cent (with the implementation of the said projects from 1985 onwards), it is deemed impossible to realize the 3 per cent increase envisioned in the Plan.

The agricultural information and applied research project deals with such issues as the usage of fertilizer and high quality seeds, fighting epidemics and pests, transmission of new harvesting techniques, sound and effective use of inputs, and education. It is expected that such measures will yield, from 1990 onwards, an additional quantity of 1.8 million tons of wheat, 140,000 tons of sunflower, 100,000 tons of corn, 17,000 tons of rice, 10,000 tons of chickpeas, 21,000 tons of lentils, and 830,000 tons of fruits. Set against the total crop production in Turkey, the increase in production remains at 1.7 per cent, however.

Livestock Production

During the new plan period, the rate of increase in livestock production is not expected to change. Despite the existing stock of beef and lamb which is among the highest in the world, the limited number of pedigree stock with high productivity lowers production considerably.

Though studies are conducted in this field, they are not likely to have much impact increasing the rate of livestock production. The Ministry officials pointed out that through artificial and natural seeding it may be possible to get results, but in the long run. During the new plan period, a 4.7 per cent increase in animal products is programmed. According to the officials, in order to reach this target it is necessary to increase fodder production, improve the composition of the fodder, and expand and accelerate such activities in general.

Officials at the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Village Affairs pointed out a combination of projects like artificial and natural seeding, encouraging beef-raising, meat-farming, and banning early slaughter of lambs is not likely to increase the existing stock of 85 million animals to a significant degree, perhaps providing no more than an indicative function. The annual increase due to artificial and natural seeding remains at 100,000-200,000 level. Meat-farming is confined to 1 million animals. The attainment of the 4.7 per cent growth target requires new policies, new orientations and support.

Neither is the agricultural information and applied research project adequate to bring about the expected increase in livestock production. With this project, from 1990 onwards, an additional amount of 11,000 tons of beef, 4,000 tons of lamb, 390,000 tons of milk, and 760 million eggs will be produced each year. The project envisions a productivity increase of 10 per cent. However, the stated targets of the project will be reached only at the end of the new plan period.

Forestry Products

An annual 3.1 per cent production rise is targeted for forestry products during the new plan period, despite the 2 per cent annual drop experienced during the 1978-1983 period.

Currently, the activities are confined to annual programs. In 1983 only 60 per cent of the reforestation and erosion control could be realized, improvement of pasture areas remained at 25 per cent level; sapling production was at 77 per cent level, and forest maintenance remained at 36 per cent. While there seems to be no new initiative connected with lumber industry, a 3.1 per cent increase in forestry products is planned.

As to the 7.7 per cent increase envisioned for aquatic products, this might require a combination of measures such as the development of fishing in internal waters, the regulation of fishing seasons and catch methods, expanding the marketing outlets, and providing support for moving into deep sea fishing.

Furthermore, while the plan envisions irrigation to reach 90 per cent level, delays in the completion of irrigation networks reduce the chances of realizing that target.

12466

CSO: 3554/265

DOGAN SEES FIVE-YEAR PLAN DICTATED BY WORLD BANK

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 26 Jun 84 p 9

[Article by Yalcin Dogan]

[Text] There are striking resemblances. One could say that terms used in certain sections, the rationales that are employed are almost the same word by word. The envisioned policies, the targeted figures are also among those "uncanny similarities."

There are undeniable similarities between the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (prepared by the State Planning Organisation (SPO) currently under review at the Budget Commission of the National Assembly) and the World Bank report (dated Feb 83, serial number 4282) titled 'Medium-term Targets for Turkey'. So much so that it is as if our SPO had 'plagiarized' from the World Bank when preparing the Plan. For instance, the rationale for "investment priorities" (which is a fundamental policy in a plan) is one and the same in our plan and the World Bank report: "In previous plans investment policies were implemented without giving much thought to options. We therefore examined the public investments, keeping those public projects deserving priority, while excluding the others from the plan." This evaluation is made in both the Plan, and the World Bank report. One then finds out that "priority investments" are the same ones in both cases.

One looks into retrospective evaluations. "Oil crisis and foreign exchange shortage" is mentioned first. However, among the causes of the foreign exchange shortage is listed the "landings in Cyprus." The major growth targets of the economy is full of "such similarities" in both documents. Our plan envisions TL 14.5 trillion worth of investments in five years, the World Bank TL 14.4 trillion. The World Bank envisions 6.1 percent annual growth, our plan 6.3 percent. Growth rates listed for the energy sector are 11.3 percent by the World Bank, and 11 percent by SPO. In agriculture, the World Bank's target is 3.1 percent growth, while the corresponding figure by SPO is 3 percent. Both SPO and the World Bank accord priority to "investments in agriculture, transportation and communication".

In this way a very important decision has been reached with regard to the upcoming five-year period in Turkish economy: In this period industrialisation takes a back seat. Investments in transportation, services, energy and housing constitute nearly 60 percent of total investments. Investments in manufacturing industries remain at 20 percent level.

Why do we observe such similarities in the envisioned policies and targeted figures of the SPO plan and the World Bank report? The World Bank completed its report in Feb 83 which is about the time when plan preparations at the SPO were pushed into high-gear. Could it mean that SPO has 'plagiarized' from the World Bank? Why should it adopt such a course?

Actually, the phenomenon cannot be explained in terms of coincidences. The origin of the similarities lies in a very fundamental fact: The world economic crisis.

Capitalism is undergoing an economic crisis. The West has not yet superseded the economic crisis which started in mid-1970s. Overcoming the crisis in the West (to which Turkey is tied) would be possible only if the West prevented industrialization in those countries that are tied to itself, and if the West cajoled others into implementing "deflationary economic policies" in those countries. How is it possible to grant permission to the peripheral economies to grow, while capitalist economies themselves have been stagnating? This is out of the question.

What happens is that the World Bank drafts an initial plan which is then used by the SPO as a prototype, the major policies of which serve as a starting point, leading to the adoption of these proposals coming from the outside. Short-term economic policies are drafted by the IMF, while the World Bank takes care of the medium-term policies, such as five-year periods.

Now we might well ask: The plan which is presently under discussion at the Parliamentary Budget Commission, whose plan is it?

12466
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'DUAL TAX' ABOLITION TO FACILITATE FRG CAPITAL INFLOW

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 26 Jun 84 pp 1,7

[Text] The problem of 'dual tax' which had been a significant obstacle to the West German firms wishing to engage in joint investments in Turkey, has been resolved by an agreement reached between the two countries. Meanwhile, work has started towards resolving this problem with seven more countries. The text of the agreement negotiated by the Ministry of Finance & Customs experts and West German officials who have reviewed the tax systems of both countries has taken final shape, and is submitted to the Prime ministry for signature. With this agreement, German firms making joint investments in Turkey will no longer be subjected to dual taxation (in terms of both Turkish and German tax regulations) during the transfer of their profits. According to information received from the Finance & Customs Ministry officials, from now on West German firms' profits derived from joint ventures in Turkey will, generally speaking, be subject to the West German taxation system. An official offered this explanation: "Since attracting foreign capital has become government policy we could not have been too insistent on the taxation of foreign capital. Greater share of the sacrifice has been borne by us."

German Capital Expected

As German firms which invest in Turkey are freed from the burden of 'dual tax', it is expected that they will launch the joint ventures already in the offing. A group of German businessmen (who had arrived in Ankara last May alongside the Federal German Minister of Agriculture) showed an interest in entering joint investments in the packaging and agricultural machinery industries, but wished to see the dual tax burden lifted. Following discussions between the officials of RAU (one of the oldest firms in Federal Germany) and Turkish Agricultural Equipment Board, the parties had agreed in principle to expand and increase the productive capacity of Urfa Agricultural Machinery Plant (UAMP). During the discussions it was also agreed that this plant would be oriented to the Middle Eastern markets.

Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry officials said they were "hoping to see the capacity of UAMP increased during the first stage of Turkish-German joint ventures." Later, "joint ventures in the packaging industry may come under consideration", they said.

Ongoing Contacts with Seven Countries

Meanwhile, official contacts are carried on with seven countries with a view to resolving the 'dual tax' problem (within the context of incentives to foreign capital and increasing the volume of foreign trade). According to information received from the Ministry of Finance & Customs officials, there have been discussions with the officials of relevant ministries from Britain, Italy, Romania, Finland, Jordan, Pakistan, and South Korea. An agreement was reached based on the principle that "profits should be taxed only once at the country where profits are made". This principle is to apply to firms of the said countries, and Turkish firms operating in those countries.

The first round of talks with Italy, Romania and Jordan has been completed. It is expected that the initial contacts with Britain, Finland, Pakistan, and South Korea will bear positive results.

Agreements have already been reached with Austria and Norway with regard to dual taxation, and implementation has started. With the agreement with West Germany concluded, the number of such countries goes up to three.

12466
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SHEEP OVERGRAZING BLAMED FOR EROSION, FOREST DAMAGE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Jun 84 p 10

[Article by Lars Lundsten]

[Excerpt] "Unfortunately Iceland is no longer ruled by sheep," said Sveinn Hallgrímsson, leaning back in his chair in his office in "Baendahöllin," the Farmers' Palace, in Reykjavik. He is a consultant on sheep raising with the Iceland Agricultural League which has its headquarters in the Farmers' Palace. Licentiate of Agronomy stands before his name on his business card. It is part of his job to believe in the future of sheep in Iceland.

Do sheep have a future in Iceland? Many talk of the problems of overproduction. They say it is too much trouble to produce agricultural products so far north. They have even blamed sheep for the erosion that plagues the country, which is almost totally devoid of forests.

One thing is clear, sheep are no longer the central factor in Icelandic society that they were for over a thousand years right up to the beginning of this century. Now only 6-7 percent of the inhabitants of the country make a living from agriculture, but sheep provide almost half the income for this section of the population.

But sheep are also important for Icelandic industry. The hides from Icelandic sheep are very well-suited for the production of suede. In the cold climate the pelt grows very thick and at the same time the cold discourages the insects that damage sheepskins in more southerly latitudes.

Entire Society Followed Sheep Cycle

In the past, life in the rural districts of Iceland was regulated by the needs of sheep. In the spring came lambing, in the early summer the flocks of sheep were taken to the hills for the summer grazing, and in the fall the animals were gathered together and taken down to the settlements for slaughtering and overwintering. In the past the entire society followed this life cycle. But that is no longer true.

"Unfortunately sheep are no longer in charge of things," said Sveinn Hallgrimsson, who estimated that the number of sheep in Iceland could be easily tripled or quadrupled, even though there are already three times as many overwintering sheep on the island as there are people.

"Iceland is an ideal place for raising sheep. There is an abundance of grassy meadows and sheep can do something people cannot--eat grass. Sheep transform the solar energy in grass into a form that we human beings can make use of," said Sveinn.

The climate on the North Atlantic island is not favorable for grain cultivation. But there is enough grass. In the past Icelandic sheep lived almost exclusively off of hay from natural meadows, but in the postwar years the burden on the natural meadows has been reduced even though the number of sheep has risen. By further increasing the production of cultivated feed the production of fodder for sheep could be quadrupled, in the view of Sveinn Hallgrimsson.

"Crops growing in northern Iceland get a lot of light and contain a lot of energy. That is why the slaughtered weight of North Iceland lambs is more than that of Swedish lambs, for example, even though summers are longer in Sweden and the lambs are able to grow for perhaps 2 months longer," said Sveinn with pride in his voice.

Sheep Unpopular

But talking about increasing sheep raising is unpopular in Iceland today. The opponents of sheep point to how unprofitable it is to export mutton. And environmentalists are concerned about how it would affect the laboriously planted Icelandic forests if sheep are allowed to roam freely.

But according to Sveinn erosion in the unwooded country is not due to sheep alone. A worsening of the climate has also had an effect, for example:

"Since sheep raising is my profession I am not completely neutral, but I think the discussion of erosion has been much too onesided. Iceland is in a phase where 'science' has a good ring to many people. Often scientific experiments are accepted as universal truths without being placed in a broader context. A reasonable amount of grazing does not increase erosion, but of course people can disagree as to what is reasonable."

There are two main reasons why sheep raising has become less attractive as a profession: the quota system and export difficulties. Since the authorities determine quotas for how many sheep each farmer is allowed to have, the flocks are often too small to be profitable. And although individual farmers are not allowed to produce enough to make a living from sheep raising alone, the entire country still produces more mutton than it consumes. It must be exported, but that is not possible without state subsidies.

Family Enterprise

Rationalization is also necessary in sheep raising, since labor is getting more expensive. In practice this means that a farm is a family enterprise that makes use of modern techniques so that a family can manage to take care of between 600 and 1,000 sheep. The technology is there but the quota system makes it hard to get permission to have more than 600 sheep.

"There is no elbowroom in Icelandic sheep raising today. Young farmers have big investment costs and they have a hard time paying their debts since they are not allowed to raise enough sheep. It would be better to allow sheep raising to develop in the direction of fewer and more economically profitable large units," said Sveinn.

Icelandic sheep raising has been more productive during the entire post-war period. Meat production has tripled even though the number of sheep has not increased by more than a third. The official ideology for sheep raising in the last few decades has been to get as high yields as possible per overwintered ewe. Twin lambs are becoming increasingly common, which means higher production. A ewe that feeds two lambs does not eat twice as much as a ewe that feeds one.

Another way of making sheep raising more efficient is to refrain from having sheep go for summer grazing on outlying fields and uplands. But it is still common for an entire parish to have its sheep out for summer grazing on common grazing lands on the high slopes from June to September.

One of the highlights of the entire year occurs in September when the farmers in the parish have gathered together and driven the sheep down from the uplands and the big division of sheep takes place. In smaller flocks the animals are driven into a round pen that is surrounded in a star-shaped pattern by the pens of the various farmers. Everyone goes searching for his own sheep. Many farmers know all their ewes by name, others have to rely on ear marks. There is a festive mood all day long and it is not just coffee that is consumed. In the evening the day is finished off with dancing.

After the sheep have been divided the slaughtering of the lambs begins. And when all the slaughtering that is necessary is done Icelandic agriculture again confronts the problem of how to arrange exports.

EFTA Choking Meat Export

"Around 20 years ago Iceland joined the European Free Trade Association, EFTA. This involved duty-free trade in industrial products and a ban on state subsidies for industrial production. But what did Iceland export at that time? Nothing but fish and meat. In my view we should have demanded an agreement on the free trade of agricultural products," said Sveinn Hallgrímsson, spreading his hands.

"Fish and meat are subsidized in the other EFTA countries. This will knock Icelanders out before long. We will not be able to live in this country 10 years from now if developments continue along the same lines they have followed in recent years," Sveinn continued.

According to him Iceland should demand that the other EFTA countries, including Finland, Norway and Sweden, stop supporting domestic production of fish and agricultural products. Icelandic lamb and mutton could easily compete with Norwegian products, for example, if Norway stopped paying subsidies to Norwegian farmers who raise sheep.

6578

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COUNTRY'S FIRST 'PROBLEM WASTE' PROCESSING PLANT STARTS TESTS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 20 Jun 84 p 9

[Article by Carl Gustav Linden]

[Text] The controversial "problem waste" plant in Riihimäki will start burning tests the week after Midsummer's Day. The first waste shipments arrived last week and consisted of oil waste. Starting in October the plant will operate at full capacity.

"Now we can handle hazardous waste at the level called for under the Waste Disposal Act. In the past large amounts of waste have gone to dumps for burning. We hope industries will make use of the facility," said chief inspector Klaus Pfister of the Environmental Affairs Ministry.

In the future the nation's hazardous waste will be processed in a facility with a gigantic furnace and a dump for long-term storage, with the end result being harmless ashes and slag. The plant was constructed in Switzerland at an estimated cost of around 300 million marks.

Finishing touches on the plant will be completed during the summer and fall; part of the 15-hectare site is now being paved with asphalt. Waste storage facilities are being built in one corner.

A thin stream of brown smoke rose out of the chimneys from the oil that was being burned to dry the seams in the brick walls of the 12-meter-long furnace. Public relations man Jukka Pursiainen, who shows visitors around the plant, assured us that the smoke would not be visible when the filter is hooked up.

On Wednesday, 27 June, the first trial run will be made with oil waste and solvent. Waste with a high toxic content will not be burned during the trial period.

In the laboratory technicians were analyzing the waste water from the first incineration trial. Supervision of air and water emissions is very strict. The plant gives off much smaller amounts of toxins than most industries.

A lab technician was studying the content of sulfur and chlorine with the help of a large piece of apparatus complete with test tubes and glass vials. A strange white foam appeared that should not have been there.

"Darn," another lab technician sighed.

Some 60,000 Tons of Waste

When the plant really gets going in the fall it is estimated that it can handle 60,000 tons of hazardous waste annually, including such things as oil, solvents, acid, pesticides and herbicides, medicine and heavy metals like copper, arsenic, mercury, cadmium, cobalt, chromium, tin and zinc.

According to director Juhani Syrjamäki hundreds of industries are standing in line for a chance to use the plant. Waste is transported from all over the country by train on the specially-built track from Riihimäki or by truck.

The 1981 law on waste disposal says that hazardous waste must be dealt with in a safe way.

The plant in Riihimäki is intended to solve the problem of the secret dumping or burning of toxic byproducts as in the Nokia and Ojanta cases.

"Now when the Riihimäki plant gets going we will tighten our requirements for the transport of waste to dumps and incinerators: we will require the same standards for handling as we have at Riihimäki. In principle this means that they will have to send the waste to Riihimäki," said Klaus Pfister of the Environmental Affairs Ministry.

Unknown Quantity of Waste

The Waste Disposal Act also says that producers of waste must report their waste. No one really knows how much hazardous waste there is in Finland. One figure that has been mentioned is 20,000 tons. But this summer the Ministry of Environmental Affairs will issue a report on waste in this country. According to the National Technical Research Institute, industries produce 160,000 tons of waste annually.

The only waste the Riihimäki plant cannot handle is PCB from condensers. The substance itself can be processed, but there is no preliminary processing available to shred the condensers. This would cost around 2 million marks and the Hazardous Waste Company, Inc., which runs the plant, has requested state support for acquiring a unit. According to Klaus Pfister the question has been discussed but no decision has been reached yet.

"It may not be that urgent, PCB is technically easy to store," he said.

At the moment PCB condensers are shipped to England and destroyed there. The problem is that the British plants are full up and in the future they might refuse to accept PCB from Finland.

Industries must pay something to get rid of their waste since the plant in Riihimäki is supposed to be self-sufficient. In order to equalize the cost of transporting the waste, industries lying more than 100 km away from the plant will get transport subsidies in proportion to the distances involved.

"Obviously it will cost companies quite a bit. It is to be hoped that from now on companies will figure in the cost of waste disposal when they develop new products," Klaus Pfister said.

Controversial Plant

Hazardous Waste, Inc. was formed in 1979 by the state, industries and municipalities. Under a supplemental law from 1983 municipalities are responsible for dealing with hazardous household waste.

The hazardous waste plant itself has had a very stormy history. When the first inquiries were made at the end of the 1970's many municipalities were eager to provide room for the facility.

But one after another the municipalities had to yield to the opposition of local inhabitants. In Orimattila the result was that town councillors had to take a stand on the issue while thousands demonstrated outside the room where the meeting was held. They voted it down.

There has also been stiff opposition to the plant in Riihimäki. So stiff that the Riihimäki Movement, a single-issue movement opposed to the plant, got two candidates elected to the municipal council. When the existence or nonexistence of the waste plant came up before the council in the spring of 1981, 8000 signatures were collected in 2 days, but the decision was for the plant by 25 to 17.

As recently as May the Riihimäki Movement complained to HFD [expansion unknown] about the county council's decision to provide an operating subsidy for the plant.

Sanny Paivio is one of the movement's founders and a representative on the municipal council.

"We are working quietly just now whenever we have an opportunity. But we have not faded away, we have a big responsibility for keeping an eye on the plant."

The hazardous waste plant is built on quite high woodland with a gravel subsoil and ground water beneath it; not at all an appropriate site, according to opponents. Behind a strip of forest broad fields open out and 4 kilometers away, on lower ground, is Riihimäki's water supply.

HFD also had to take a stand in May on a complaint from the Water Board which felt that the county council had exceeded its authority when it drew

up plans to protect the water. The plant was required to dig several control wells for ground water around the site if necessary.

"It is clear that the plant is here to stay, there is nothing we can do about that. But if we see that the HFD decision is not being adhered to, we will do something," said Sanny Paivio.

The Riihimäki Movement was not sure at this time whether it will back candidates for the municipal election in the fall. According to Sanny Paivio there have been offers of election alliances from several quarters. The Riihimäki Movement has no contact with the Greens.

Riihimäki Attracting Industries

The building of a hazardous waste plant in Riihimäki has coincided with the town's liveliest investment activity. In 3 or 4 years domestic and foreign industries have invested at least 300 million marks in Riihimäki.

"A landslide has started and it is unlikely to stop for a long time," said assistant town manager Ensi R. Louhiluoto.

In 1981 the town council, on the recommendation of the board, decided to accept the waste treatment plant. The decision came at a time of great unrest: the town's glass industry had thrown thousands of workers, a quarter of the total labor force, on the street. The town with a total of 10,000 jobs needed something to turn to. And in addition to jobs the hazardous waste plant offered practically free heat.

"If the town board had had the slightest doubt that the council would give its approval, it would probably never have presented the proposal," said assistant town manager Louhiluoto.

The upturn came not because of but at the same time as the plant construction got under way. The town's newly-formed industrial center attracted investments far beyond what had been expected.

"We did everything we could to improve the situation for industries in Riihimäki. We conducted advertising campaigns, sent letters directly to firms, etc. We were probably best served by the reports that were written. It is true that we went to industrial fairs, but that was only a passive form of activity," said Louhiluoto.

Landslide

Louhiluoto compared the result with a landslide that started up and is unlikely to stop for a long time: when one firm makes an investment another follows with another investment.

In addition to loans with easy terms Riihimäki put in very little in the form of straight subsidies. The important thing was to open the eyes of industry to Riihimäki's location on the map.

"In the 280 kilometers between Helsinki and Tampere there are ten towns with a total of 1 million inhabitants. The railway and highways run along this strip and in the middle of this group of towns lies Riihimäki. It can be compared with the Boston-Washington line, for example," Louhivuori said.

The main branch to bite at the town's hook was the food branch with its requirement for rapid transport. Sausages, bread, milk products and frozen food are products that are now delivered from Riihimäki to southern Finland.

Seven other places in southern Finland started up industrial parks at the same time as Riihimäki. But investments in Riihimäki now exceed investments in the seven other industrial centers put together. So far these investments have provided 500 new jobs.

Negative aspects of the industrial expansion are sensitivity to the market and a one-sided economy. It has also pushed up property prices and housing rental costs in the town.

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